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INTRODUCTION 
What does it mean to "sell" a financial asset? The answer has con-
founded courts and commentators for some time. The question has taken 
on increased importance with the rise of the securitization industry. A 
financial asset is a right to payment of money. Examples include trade 
receivables (rights to payment for goods sold or services rendered), lease 
rentals, mortgage and other loans, license and franchise fees, and any other 
legal or contractual right to payment. l 
Transfers of financial assets in which the parties state that they intend 
a sale, and in which all the benefits and risks commonly associated with 
ownership are transferred for fair value in an arm's-length transaction, are 
easily identifiable as sales. The issue becomes complicated if the buyer 
retains recourse to the seller such that less than all of the risks of ownership 
are transferred. In that case, an issue can arise over whether to view the 
transaction as a sale or a secured loan. But why? 
Under contract law, parties generally are free to enter into and enforce 
any contract that is not illegal or against public policy; there is nothing 
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I. This Article does not address the sale of financial assets associated with the transfer of 
other assets essential to the seller's business, such as the assignment of tradenames and trade-
marks to support the sale of future payments under franchise agreements. 
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about recourse, for example, that either is illegal or in violation of public 
policy. Common law favors the free transfer of rights to receive money 
where there are no significant externalities that have consequences to third 
parties. 2 There is no legal or public policy which precludes a transferor 
from improving the value of an asset sold by adding its own guarantee. 
When a financial asset represented by a check or other draft is transferred, 
recourse is the common, accepted, and sometimes mandatory conse-
quence of transfer. Indorsement with recourse has never been viewed as 
precluding the existence of a sale. 
A seller might agree to some kind of recourse because it wants the 
benefits of the sale and is prepared to incur recourse in order to induce 
someone to buy the asset. The most common example is the sale of goods 
backed by warranties. The Official Comments to the UC.C. recognize 
that "there may be a true sale of accounts, [or] chattel paper ... although 
recourse exists."3 
The complication arises most often when a buyer of a financial asset 
attempts to enforce or has to defend its ownership rights to an asset in the 
seller's subsequent bankruptcy case.4 In bankruptcy, for example, if the 
sale were treated as a sale, the buyer would e~oy greater rights and privi-
leges than if the sale were treated as a loan. The asset would belong to the 
buyer. It would not be part of the seller's bankruptcy estate, and the buyer 
would not have to worry about the automatic stay, turnover, or any inter-
ference with its property rights. This result is good for the buyer, but some 
might argue that it damages the debtor's chances for rehabilitation and 
creditors' expectations of equal treatment. Because of this tension between 
the buyer's interest and those of the debtor and its creditors, recharacter-
ization issues often arise in bankruptcy cases. When they do, they appear 
largely to turn on whether the existence of recourse turns a "sale" into a 
"loan. " 
But if, as the UC.C. comment states, there may be a true sale even with 
recourse, then under what circumstances should a bankruptcy court re-
characterize a sale as a loan? Furthermore, is it a question of state law, 
federal law, or both? 
2. The Uniform Commercial Code (V.C.C.) declares "ineffective" any contract term that 
"prohibits assignment of an account." UC.C. § 9-318(4) (1995); see UC.C. § 9-318 cmt. 4 
(1995), which notes that this provision 
states a rule of law which is widely recognized in the cases and which corresponds to 
current business practices. It can be regarded as a revolutionary departure only by those 
who still cherish the hope that we may yet return to the views entertained some two 
hundred years ago by the Court of King's Bench. 
See also PEB Commentary No. 14 Gune 10, 1994). 
3. UC.C. § 9-502 cmt. 4 (1995). The UC.C., with limited exceptions, applies to the sale 
of accounts. /d. § 9-1 02(b). 
4. True sale issues continue to arise in usury cases as well. See People v. Service Inst., Inc., 
421 N.YS.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1979). 
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The authors of this Article try to answer these questions by rethinking 
the role of recourse in the sale of financial assets. The concept of "true 
sale" is profoundly significant in today's commercial world. Defining true 
sale is the holy grail of the securitization market, a market in which hun-
dreds of billions of dollars flow in transactions structured around constantly 
evolving ideas of what true sale means. In structuring true sale transactions, 
tension often arises between the desire for a certain amount of recourse 
and the belief that "too much" recourse will prevent true sale treatment.5 
There is no single case that presents a comprehensive theory of the effect 
of recourse in a true sale. Little thought has been given, for example, to 
the competing policy issues of balancing the need for clarity, fairness, and 
simplicity in commercial transactions6 with those bankruptcy law policies 
that may be affected by treating a transfer with recourse as a sale rather 
than a loan. Yet, sale characterization has important consequences. 
If the transfer of the future payment stream from the originator 
[seller] to the third party [purchaser] fails to constitute a true sale 
under § 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, the transfer would be deemed 
an advance of funds by the third party to the originator secured by 
the payment stream, i.e., a secured loan. The third party would then 
be a creditor of the originator and have a security interest, but not 
an ownership interest, in the payment stream. In such a case, the 
originator's bankruptcy would, under § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, 
automatically result in a stay of all actions by creditors to foreclose 
on or otherwise obtain property of the originator. The third party 
may not be able to obtain payments collected on the payment stream 
until the stay is modified. Further, under § 363 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, a court, after notice to creditors and the opportunity of a hear-
ing, could order the cash collections of the payment stream to be used 
by the originator in its business as working capital if the originator or 
its trustee in bankruptcy provides adequate protection for the interest 
of the third party in the payment stream. ''Adequate protection," 
though, does not always translate into an alternative cash source. 
5. See Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale r!f Loans and the Role r!f Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 287, 306-07 (1991). Concerns over recourse and its effect on true sale treatment have 
caused one rating agency to say that in certain structured financings there "should be no 
recourse against the seller for defaulted receivables beyond a reasonably anticipated default 
rate based upon historical analysis." STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATION, STRUCTURED 
FINANCE CRITERIA 69 (1988). When the authors refer to "recourse," they mean not only 
contractual recourse but also any type of credit support the seller may provide to the buyer. 
For example, a seller that retains a subordinated interest in the financial asset it sells as part 
of the consideration it receives in the sale provides the buyer with recourse to the extent of 
the subordinated interest. Any loss suffered, if the asset fails to collect, is suffered first by the 
seller to the extent of its retained subordinated interest. 
6. See International Trade Admin. v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 936 F.2d 744, 751 (2d 
Cir. 1991); Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry Into the Statutory Rulemaking Process r!f 
Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909 (1995). 
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In addition, § 364 of the Bankruptcy Code also would permit the 
originator, if credit is not otherwise available to it and if adequate 
protection is given to the third party, to raise cash by granting to new 
lenders a lien that is either pari passu with that of the third party, or 
if a pari passu lien cannot attract new financing, a lien having priority 
over the third party's lien. 7 
Because the law fails to define clearly the effect of recourse in a sale, 
virtually all of the securitization transactions that involve noninvestment 
grade originators or the issuance of publicly traded securities require a 
two-tier structure to avoid the risk that recourse might disqualify true sale 
treatment for a transfer.s 
In this Article, the authors analyze the caselaw and define, in their view, 
the consequences of the presence of recourse in sales of financial assets. 
The analysis in this Article assumes an arm's-length transaction in which 
the buyer has taken all requisite steps to perfect its interest in the asset it 
buys.9 The authors conclude that: 
(i) A distinction in law can be made between two types of recourse, 
7. Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater than the Whole: How Securitization qf Diuisible 
Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 
1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 139, 144 n.16. 
8. A two-tier structure is a way of resolving the conflict between the high recourse level, 
or overcollateralization, desired by investors and the economic goal that excess collections 
be returned to the seller: 
If the originator is not investment grade, a sale for bankruptcy purposes will be required 
to protect investors from the risks associated with the originator's possible bankruptcy. 
This bankruptcy risk can be avoided, while minimizing the cost of overcollateralization, 
by structuring the securitization transaction with two SPVs [special purpose vehicles] 
in a two tier structure, also known as "FINCO" (finance company) structure. Under 
this method, the originator first sells receivables to a wholly owned SPY in a transaction 
that constitutes a true sale for bankruptcy purposes and thus achieves bankruptcy pro-
tection. The wholly owned SPY then transfers its receivables to an independent Spy 
in a transaction that constitutes a sale for accounting purposes but not necessarily for 
bankruptcy purposes. The independent Spy issues securities in the capital markets to 
fund the transfer. After the independent Spy pays off the securities, it can reconvey the 
remaining receivables and collections to the wholly owned SPY without impairing the 
accounting characterization as a sale. The wholly owned SPY is then merged into the 
originator, or alternatively, the remaining receivables and collections are transferred 
back to the originator, as dividends. This structure thus allows the originator to realize 
the value of any excess receivables and collections created by the original overcollater-
alization. 
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy qf Asset Securitization, I STANFORD J.L. Bus. & FIN. 133, 142 
(1994) (footnotes omitted). 
9. In addition to the perfection rules of UC.C. Article 9, which generally apply to sales 
of accounts and chattel paper, other state perfection laws might apply to sales of other kinds 
of personal property. See Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale qf Accounts and 
Chattel Paper Under the U C. C. and the E;fficts qf Violating a Fundamental Drafling Principle, 26 CONN. 
L. REV. 397 (1994); see also infta note 66. 
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which are identified by this Article as recourse for collectibility 
and economic recourse. Recourse for collectibility is the equiva-
lent of warranting that the asset will perform in accordance with 
its terms. Economic recourse is the equivalent of warranting a 
return to the buyer of its investment plus an agreed upon yield 
unrelated to the asset's payment terms. As a matter of state law, 
the transfer of a financial asset in an arm's-length transaction 
should be treated as a sale if the parties so state, even if the buyer 
retains partial or full recourse for collectibility against the seller. 
If the buyer retains economic recourse against the seller, however, 
the transaction is susceptible to recharacterization as a loan. The 
rationale underlying the case law is that when recourse relates 
only to the quality of the asset being sold, that type of recourse is 
consistent with a sale (similar to a warranty on sale); but when 
the recourse goes beyond the quality of the asset and ensures an 
economic rate of return to the purported buyer that is unrelated 
to the payment terms of the underlying asset, the asset serves 
merely as collateral and the transaction is susceptible to being 
recharacterized as a loan. 
(ii) A sale under state law should be treated as a sale in bankruptcy, 
even if the buyer has partial or full recourse for collectibility 
against the seller. Although bankruptcy policies may require a 
bankruptcy court to determine independently whether rechar-
acterization is appropriate, state law principles of recharacteri-
zation must govern the analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
specifically found that following state contract law is necessary to 
reduce uncertainty by treating interests uniformly within a state 
and to prevent a party from receiving a windfall by the happen-
stance of bankruptcy.lo State law is determinative of contractual 
rights when the contract for the sale of financial assets is formed, 
and to preempt state law by reason of the occurrence of a bank-
ruptcy upsets the economic bargain reached between the parties. 
This Article then applies these principles to a variety of transaction 
structures that are used, or potentially useful, in the marketplace. It illus-
trates that, in many cases involving the sale of financial assets, a true sale 
determination can be made even if the buyer were to have full or partial 
recourse to the seller for collectibility. 
DISCUSSION 
THE ROLE OF RECOURSE IN TRUE SALES 
Although the cases involving sales of financial assets with recourse are 
not uniform, a significant number of them support the hypothesis that the 
10. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979). 
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difference between sale and loan characterization is the difference between 
recourse for collectibility and economic recourse. 
Reconciling the Role of Recourse in True Sales 
Recharacterization cases are centuries old. I I They illustrate that the law 
may not treat a transaction as a sale just because the buyer and seller 
labeled it a sale. If the buyer later attempts to enforce its rights as a buyer 
and someone (usually the seller or its creditors) then challenges the sale as 
a loan, a court, under certain circumstances, could recharacterize the sale 
as a loan. 
Generally, the party seeking recharacterization had to prove two things 
in order to prevail. First, it had to prove that recharacterization was nec-
essary to avoid a result that would otherwise be illegal or violate public 
policy. Usury was a favorite charge of those seeking recharacterization. 12 
Grant Gilmore also suggests that recharacterization was used most often 
against transactions that were called sales in order to evade state or local 
recording requirements or compliance with "long-drawn-out, expensive 
and uncertain foreclosure proceedings." 13 On occasion, a transferor would 
seek to recharacterize a sale as a loan in order to recover the surplus above 
the purchase price plus interest that the transferee of the asset had col-
lected. 14 
Second, the challenging party had to establish that the transaction was, 
in substance, intended to be a loan even if it took the form of a sale. 
Although the courts considered a number of factors to determine the par-
ties' true intentions and whether to recharacterize, the underlying reason 
for loan recharacterization was that the buyer's interest in the transaction 
did not sufficiently reflect the characteristics of ownership. Often courts 
would recharacterize because the transferee's interest in the asset was lim-
ited to its investment plus a predetermined rate of return, with all surplus 
II. GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2.6, at 47 
(1965). 
12. Annotation, When Tranifer if Accounts or Other Choses in Action is Deemed a Sale Rather than 
a Pledge as SecurityJor a Loan and Vice Versa, 95 A.L.R. 1197 (1935). See Le Sueur v. Manufac-
turers' Fin. Co., 285 F. 490 (6th Cir. 1922); National Discount Co. v. Evans (In re Hitt Lumber 
& Box Co.), 272 F. 570 (6th Cir. 1921); Commercial Sec. Co. v. Holcombe (In re E.E. Forbes 
Piano Co.), 262 F. 657 (5th Cir. 1920); West Pico Furniture Co. v. Pacific Fin. Loans, 469 
P.2d 665 (Cal. 1970); Dorothy v. Commonwealth Commercial Co., 116 N.E. 143 (Ill. 1917); 
Mercantile Trust Co. v. Kastor, 112 N.E. 988 (Ill. 1916); Kelter v. American Bankers' Fin. 
Co., 160 A. 127 (pa. 1932). 
13. GIl.MORE, supra note II, § 2.6, at 49. 
14. Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979); Isaak 
v. Journey, 15 F.2d 1069 (Idaho 1932). The issue at stake in these kinds of cases is reflected 
in U.C.C. § 9-502(2) (1995), which mandates that if a transfer is for security, as opposed to 
an outright sale, the transferee "must account to the debtor for any surplus." Id. 
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going to the transferor. IS This arrangement obviously indicated something 
other than a true sale of the benefits of ownership. 
For instance, in Home Bond Co. v. McChesney,16 the Supreme Court af-
firmed a decision to recharacterize a sale of accounts as a loan. The Su-
preme Court emphasized the fact that the ownership in the accounts was 
not transferred because the buyer only acquired the right to recover from 
the proceeds of the accounts the amount it had advanced plus a prede-
termined rate of interest. 17 The buyer had recourse to the seller if an 
account debtor defaulted, but recourse was limited to the amount paid for 
the account plus interest, and not the face amount of the account. 18 On 
the other hand, in Chase & Baker Co. v. National Trust & Credit CO.,19 the fact 
that the seller was obligated to repurchase defaulted accounts at their face 
value, and not just for the amount paid by the buyer plus interest, indicated 
to the court that the parties intended a sale.2o 
In virtually all of the recharacterization cases, including those in which 
the fight was over which party was entitled to the surplus, the nature of 
the buyer's recourse to the seller became the key issue in the debate over 
whether the transfer was a sale or a loan. 21 
An example is in In re Grand Union Co.,22 in which a company "sold" 
certain leases with recourse to a credit company. The court acknowledged 
"[t]he fact that the bankrupt guaranteed payment of principal and interest 
15. Typically, the rate of return was also unrelated to the return implied by the payment 
terms of the transferred asset. As discussed below, this also was relevant to the issue of whether 
the presence of recourse prevented true sale treatment. See infta text accompanying notes 38-
40. 
16. 239 U.S. 568 (1916). 
17. Id. at 575; see Sponge Exch. Bank v. Commercial Credit Co., 263 F. 20 (5th Cir. 1920). 
The court stated: 
When by the terms of a transaction by which an indorsee acquires a note he is required 
to pay, or account to the indorser for, so much of what is collected on it as is in excess 
of an amount advanced and agreed interest thereon, the transaction is not a sale of the 
note, and the indorsee is not the buyer of it. 
Id. at 25; Comm~cial Sec. Co., 262 F. at 661 (entitling debtor to collections on sold accounts in 
excess of buyer's stipulated rate of return); Dorothy, 116 N.E. at 149 (" [I]f an account ... 
discounted for four months or for a year was paid in one month, it was treated as a one-
month account, and adjusted accordingly in the settlement between the two companies."); 
Kel~, 160 A. at 130 ("On profitable contracts a balance was paid by the so-called 'buyer' of 
the contract to the alleged 'seller.' "); see also Annotation, When Transf~ qf Accounts or Oth~ 
Chases in Action Is Deemed a Sale Rath~ Than a Pledge as Securityfor a Loan and Vice Vma, 95 A.L.R. 
1197 (1935), and cases cited therein. 
18. Home Bond, 239 U.S. at 575; see National Discount Co. v. Evans, 272 F. 570, 573-74 
(6th Cir. 1921) (holding repurchase obligation limited to amount advanced by buyer, plus 
interest). 
19. 215 F. 633 (N.D. Ill. 1914). 
20. /d. at 638-39. 
21. See supra note 12, and cases cited therein. 
22. 219 F. 353 (2d Cir. 1914). 
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as well as leases 'purchased' ... does not, standing alone, convert the sale 
... into a 10an."23 The court nevertheless recharacterized the sale as a 
loan because the seller, among other things, not only guaranteed collec-
tibility, but "made itself responsible for every conceivable loss" and guar-
anteed the buyer's rate of return regardless of what payments either were 
called for or collected under the lease.24 The Third Circuit, more than 
sixty years later, had a similar reaction in Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle 
Credit Corp.:25 
Castle required Major's to retain all conceivable risks of uncollecti-
bility of these accounts. It required ... that Major's warrant that the 
accounts were ... "fully and timely collectible" [and there was an 
obligation to repurchase any account sixty days overdue]. Guaranties 
qf quality alone, or even guarantees qf collectibility alone, might be consistent with 
a true sale, but Castle attempted to shift all risks to Major's, and incur none qf 
the risks or obligations qf ownership. 26 
Although recharacterization cases, like Major's Furniture Mart and Grand 
Union, acknowledged that there could be a true sale with recourse,27 they 
failed to address the circumstances under which recourse would not jeop-
ardize true sale treatment. In other cases, courts have held sales with re-
course to the seller to be true sales. In those cases, however, the seller 
typically guarantees that the asset will perform (i.e., collect) as warranted 
and remains contingently liable for collection risk if it does not. 28 
For example, in Coast Finance Corp. v. Ira R Powers Furniture CO.,29 the court 
upheld a sale in which the plaintiff, Coast, paid the defendant, Powers, 
$100 in exchange for "the first $109.91 ofa certain conditional sales con-
tract."30 At the time of sale, a balance of$282.63, payable in ten monthly 
installments, remained unpaid. Powers, the seller, warranted that the con-
tract was "genuine and that the balance represented is unpaid and not 
subject to offset or counterclaim,"31 and also guaranteed payment of the 
outstanding amount in accordance with the contract. When Powers later 
refused to remit collections to Coast, Coast sued. Powers claimed that the 
23. Id. at 361. 
24. /d. at 361-62. 
25. 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979). 
26. /d. at 545 (emphasis added). The Third Circuit, in affirming the lower court's decision 
to recharacterize, also emphasized the fact that if Major's defaulted under its agreement with 
the "buyer" or went out of business, "Major's was required to repurchase all outstanding 
accounts immediately" without regard to performance by the account debtors. Id. at 541; see 
In re Lendvest Mortgage, Inc., 119 B.R. 199, 200-01 (B.A.p. 9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the 
assignor "guaranteed that the [assignee] would have no loss at all" and applying state law). 
27. See also UC.C. § 9-502 cmt. 4 (I995). 
28. See Nebraska Dep't of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 115 S. Ct. 557, 563 (1994). 
29. 209 P. 614 (Or. 1922). 
30. /d. at 614. 
31. Id. at 615. 
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transaction was a loan, not a sale, and argued that the payment to Coast 
of $lO9.91 for a $lOO loan would be usurious. The court refused to re-
characterize the sale as a loan stating: 
When the holder of an instrument, such as the conditional sales con-
tract held by defendant, transfers the instrument at a discount and is 
required to indorse or otherwise guarantee it so that the vendor be-
comes liable contingently to pay the purchaser at a future day a sum 
greater than that received with legal interest, the authorities present 
different views. The great weight if authority is that such a transaction should 
be regarded as a valid sale if a chattel with a warranty if soundness and the 
purchaser is allowed to eriforce the obligation to its foil extent against his own 
indorser and all prior parties. 
It appears that plaintiff was in the business of discounting contracts 
and commercial paper. From the facts stated in defendant's answer 
quoted above, and the stipulation as to the position of the plaintiff 
and the defendant, the court was warranted in finding that the as-
signment of the conditional sales contract, in consideration of the sum 
of $100, was a bona fide sale of an interest in the contract. Any 
contrary holding would clog the wheels of commerce. As far as the 
record shows, the transaction did not constitute a loan; there was no 
understanding between the parties that defendant should return the 
money to plaintiff, except in the contingency that the original prom-
isor ... should make default in payment; and it was a pure bargain 
and sale of an interest in the contract, and no rate of interest was 
agreed upon. As far as shown, the sale was made in entire good faith, 
and there was no corrupt intent to exact a usurious rate ofinterest. 32 
Other courts have likewise ruled that a sale with recourse solely for 
collectibility to the seller is still a sale.33 The difference between cases like 
32. Id. at 615-16 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
33. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mid-West Chevrolet Co., 66 F.2d I (10th 
Cir. 1933). The court stated that 
[b]efore there can be usury, there must be a loan. A loan of money involves an absolute 
agreement to return the sum borrowed at a future time. No usury can attach to a bona 
fide sale of property, tangible or intangible, even though it is accompanied by an agree-
ment of the seller to indemnifY the buyer against loss. 
/d. at 4-5; see also Investors Thrift v. AMA Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d 205, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1967) (citing case law to the effect that "a guarantee of the validity of accounts implemented 
by an agreement to repurchase 'uncollectible or disputed accounts' did not, per se, render 
the transaction a loan"); Advance Indus. Fin. Co. v. Western Equities, Inc., 343 P.2d 408, 
413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding accounts sold with recourse "w[ere] a real purchase, not 
a loan"); Refinance Corp. v. Northern Lumber Sales, 329 P.2d 109, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) 
(same); Indian Lake Estates, Inc. v. Special Invs., Inc., 154 So. 2d 883, 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1963) (citing several cases, including Coast, in concluding that an assignment of "in-
stallment sales contracts ... is regarded as a sale, not a loan, despite a provision for recourse 
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Grand Union and Mqjor's Furniture Mart on the one hand, and Coast Finance 
on the other hand, seems to be the nature of the recourse involved. Most 
of the cases in which the courts recharacterized a purported sale as a loan 
involved the sale of accounts not represented by instruments or chattel 
paper.34 In a typical transaction, the "buyer" would purchase receivables 
at a discount from face value and hold back some portion of the purchase 
price as a "reserve." Although the discount might vary with the age of the 
or guaranty"); State Bank v. Northwestern Sec. Co., 199 N.W. 240 (Minn. 1924) (note sold 
at a discount with guaranty of "payment when due of each and every installment ... [of] 
each and every note" deemed a sale, not a loan); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. 
Weinrich, 262 S.w. 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1924) (commercial payer sold at a discount with 
guaranty of "payment when due of each and every installment ... [of] each and every note" 
deemed a sale, not a loan); A.B. Lewis Co. v. National Inv. Corp., 421 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1967), where the court explained that: 
[t]he fact is, however, that the language ... 'with full recourse' was to impose a contin-
gent obligation on appellant to pay the amount of the sales contract if the buyer of the 
automobile did not do so. Such an obligation is not inconsistent with a sale of the 
contract rather than a pledge to secure a loan. 
Id. at 728; Starker v. Heckart, 267 P.2d 219 (Or. 1954) (following Coast Finance); Martin v. 
McAvoy, 228 P. 694 (Wash. 1924); see irifra note 45 and cases cited therein. 
34. Some courts have gone so far as to try to reconcile cases that differ on whether recourse 
affects true sale by creating a distinction between sales of ordinary accounts receivable Qoan) 
and sales of installment paper or other instruments (sale). See, e.g., Indian Lake Estates, 154 So. 
2d at 891 ("It should be emphasized that the agreements here do not involve ordinary 
accounts receivable, but the sale oflot purchase installment contracts. A transfer at a discount 
of installment sales contracts ... is regarded as a sale, not a loan, despite a provision for 
recourse or guaranty. "). Apart from whether this distinction makes sense as a matter of law, 
it does not exist as a matter of fact. Although most cases in which sales have been rechar-
acterized as loans involved accounts, assignments with recourse of installment contracts have 
been recharacterized as loans. See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 
602 E2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Union Co., 219 E 353 (2d Cir. 1914); Dorothy v. 
Commonwealth Commercial Co., 116 N.£. 143 (Ill. 1917). Sales of ordinary accounts with 
recourse also have been treated as true sales. See, e.g., Chase & Baker Co. v. National Trust 
& Co., 215 E 633 (N.D. Ill. 1914); Investors Thrift v. AMA Corp., 255 Cal. App. 2d 205 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Advance Indus. Fin. Co. v. Western Equities, Inc., 343 P.2d 408 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1959). Moreover, the reason most of the cases involved accounts was not because 
of any particular law or policy about recharacterization that was unique to accounts. A major 
reason most of the cases involved ordinary accounts receivable was because many of the 
cases were decided before the promulgation of the U.C.C. Under the U.C.C., procedures 
were established which generally assured that perfection of a transfer of interests in ordinary 
accounts receivable would survive a challenge under the "strong-arm" power found in § 70(c) 
of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (§ 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code). Under laws which predated 
the U.C.C., it was problematic whether a creditor could sufficiently perfect its interest in 
undocumented receivables so as to obtain priority in the event the debtor filed for bankruptcy. 
As a result, the effect of recharacterizing a sale of an account as a loan was significant. The 
transferee went from having ownership of the account to mere standing as a general unse-
cured creditor. These high stakes encouraged litigation and gave rise to the large number of 
reported decisions concerning sales of accounts. Today, the consequences of recharacteri-
zation to a buyer who has properly perfected its interest in the sold accounts is not nearly as 
dramatic. See infta text accompanying note 103. 
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account to reflect risk, often the discount did not attempt to compensate 
the buyer completely for the time value of money. 35 Additional compen-
sation for the time value of money-the buyer's yield-was determined 
in advance and paid as interest either directly36 or disguised as a "service 
charge" in order to avoid usury laws. 37 More important, however, recourse 
for the buyer's return was fixed, calculated in advance, at a rate unrelated 
to the payment terms of the underlying asset. 38 
35. This is evident from the fact that the buyer would often charge the same discount for 
accounts that could be expected to collect at different times. For instance, in Grand Union, the 
buyer applied the same discount to receivables that were expected to collect at different 
times. See Grand Union, 219 F. at 360. 
36. See id. at 360 (interest payable by seller at six percent per annum). 
37. See Merchants' Transfer & Storage Co. v. Rafferty (In re Gotham Can Co.), 48 F.2d 
540 (2d Cir. 1931) (noting seller paid "service charge" of one percent per day upon outstand-
ing balance of accounts); Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 724 (E.D. Pa. 1929), 
qff'd, 43 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1930) (same); see also National Discount Co. v. Evans, 272 F. 570, 
573 (6th Cir. 1921) (noting charge of one percent per month on face value of purchased 
accounts for "services rendered"). 
38. In many cases, the absence of a relationship between recourse for the buyer's return 
and the return implied by the asset's terms was obvious. See Commercial Sec. v. Holcombe, 
262 F. 657, 661-62 (5th Cir. 1920), stating that: 
a transfer of paper evidencing indebtedness payable after the date of the transfer, and 
which does not include any interest, is not a sale, is quite obvious, when the transferor 
is required to pay to the transferee interest on the amount owing on such paper before 
anything is payable by the maker, and the transferor has the right to reacquire the paper 
by paying to the transferee the sum it calls for with interest thereon. 
See also Mqjor's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 546 (unilateral imposition of floating interest rate 
on price term of the agreement "treated the transaction as ... a loan situation"); Grand Union, 
219 F. at 360 (Grand Union was "paying interest to the Hamilton Investment Company at 
the rate of 6 percent per annum, although the leases themselves bore no interest"); Ryan v. 
Zinker (In re Sprint Mortgage Bankers Corp.), 164 B.R. 224 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1994), qff'd, 
177 B.R. 4, 25 U.C.C. Rep. Servo 2d 1267 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1995). The court noted that: 
a guaranteed rate of return was promised, as well as a specific date of return of all funds 
one (I) year from the date of the investment. The one year maturity date was often in 
advance of the maturity date of the mortgage, and was not the same date as the last 
due date on the mortgage. 
/d. at 226; European Am. Bank V. Sackman Mortgage Corp. (In re Sackman Mortgage Corp.), 
158 B.R. 926, 935 (Bankr. S.D.NY 1993) (interest rate guaranteed to participant by assignor 
calculated differently than rate payable by underlying obligor); Ables V. Major Funding Corp. 
(In re Major Funding Corp.), 82 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987) ("The investors were 
promised a set return on their investment regardless of the rate on the 'assigned note.' "); 
Castle Rock Indus. Bank V. S.O.A.W Enter., Inc. (In re S.0.A.W Enter., Inc.), 32 B.R. 279, 
282-83 (Bankr. WD. Tex. 1983) (holding 30% "participation" in debtor/assignor's real prop-
erty sales contracts deemed a loan where rate of return to the participant was unrelated to 
the return under the contract and where the debtor and its president "personally guaranteed 
the return to [the participant] of its investment and guaranteed the interest to be generated 
by [its] investment"). 
Evidence that the recourse for buyer's return was unrelated to the payment terms of the 
underlying asset was obvious from the fact that the discounted purchase price for the pur-
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Recourse for the buyer's return in these cases was unrelated to the 
payment terms of the underlying asset. The buyer's recourse to the seller, 
therefore, had nothing to do with collectibility. Recourse for collectibility 
creates a contingent obligation to pay only if the underlying obligor de-
faults. 39 In most of the recharacterization cases, the buyer's recourse for 
its return was not conditioned upon default, but upon the mere passage 
of time. The buyer's return was predetermined, unrelated to the return 
earned on the underlying asset, and usually not affected by an increase in 
the value of the asset that might arise were the asset to collect sooner than 
expected. The obvious consequence of all of this was made clear in the 
following illustration by the court in Dorothy v. Commonwealth Commercial:4o 
For instance, if an account or piano contract which was discounted 
for four months or for a year was paid in one month, it was treated 
as a one-month account, and adjusted accordingly in the settlement 
between the two companies. On the other hand, if a four-months 
account ran over four months, it was adjusted on the advanced basis, 
thus indicating that it was the intention that the [seller] should be 
charged for the money loaned to it for the time it used the money.41 
In cases like Coast Financial, recourse was only for collectibility. The buyer 
purchased the asset at a discount calculated to reflect the buyer's return 
based upon the payment terms of the asset. If the asset failed to perform 
as warranted, the seller paid. If the payment occurred sooner than ex-
pected, the buyer realized the upside. The economics of the buyer's re-
chased account could not be calculated until the account actually collected. The later the 
account collected, the greater the discount (whether expressed as a straight discount reflected 
in the purchase price or as the seller's obligation to pay a rate of return from a retained 
interest in the sold accounts). If an account was collected sooner than expected, the discount 
would be less. The discount, however, was not fixed at the outset of the sale based upon 
anticipated collections. Therefore, recourse was not to warrant that the account would collect 
when expected, but simply to insure that whatever the collections were the buyer would 
receive an agreed-upon return, with the surplus going to the seller. See Union Sec., Inc. v. 
Merchants' Trust & Say. Co., 185 N.E. 150 (Ind. 1933); cases cited supra note 17; see also In 
re Carolina Uti!. Supply Co., 118 B.R. 412, 416 (Bankr. D.S.C. I 990)(holding sale of accounts 
deemed a loan where purchaser received a stipulated return of two percent above prime on 
funds advanced until accounts collected). In the seminal article on the sale of divisible interests 
and bankruptcy, Schwarcz refers to this type of recourse as "adjustable recourse" because 
the recourse adjusts retroactively to the actual collection rate to reflect the time value of 
money. Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 158. It is not fixed at the time of purchase and tied to the 
payment terms of the underlying asset. 
Finally, the fact that a seller has an obligation to repurchase accounts under circumstances 
unrelated to the account debtor's failure to perform suggested that recourse, and thus the 
economics of the buyer's bargain, was unrelated to the collectibility of the asset sold. Major's 
Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 541; Blackford v. Commercial Credit Corp., 263 F.2d 97, \05-06 
(5th Cir. 1959). 
39. See A.B. Lewis Co. v. National Inv. Corp., 421 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). 
40. 116 N.E. 143 (Ill. 1917) 
41. Id. at 149. 
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course against the seller were tied directly to the collectibility of the un-
derlying asset. The seller's recourse exposure was not that of a borrower, 
but that of a seller who, by accepting recourse, agrees to a "plain contract 
of bargain and sale, with a warranty of soundness of the property. "42 
Recourse to a seller who warrants performance of the asset it sells (i.e., 
collectibility) should not turn a sale into a loan. Under the case law, how-
ever, an absolute promise by the seller to repay the purchase price, with 
an agreed upon rate of return unrelated to the payment terms of the 
underlying asset, clearly risks turning a sale into a loan. In recognizing this 
principle, it is important to understand that the difference between re-
course for collectibility and economic recourse is not the difference be-
tween a buyer accepting significant financial risk and one who accepts 
none. In fact, in some situations, the economic bargain between a true 
buyer of a financial asset who has recourse for collectibility and a lender 
with economic recourse can be roughly equal. 43 On the one hand, a true 
buyer, unlike a lender, cannot adjust its return after the purchase to ensure 
a market return at all times.44 A buyer, however, would enjoy the upside 
in value if, for instance, the asset was collected earlier than the parties 
expected. And so long as the buyer has recourse for collectibility, it could 
protect itself against the underlying obligor's default. 
The real difference between recourse for collectibility and economic 
recourse is what each says about the type of transaction the parties in-
tended. Recourse for collectibility merely improves the quality of the asset 
transferred. The purchaser with recourse cannot do better economically 
than the purchaser without recourse if the asset performs in accordance 
with its terms. The economic terms of the transaction are defined by the 
cash flows of the asset itself and collectibility recourse is defined solely by 
the failure of the asset to perform. On the other hand, economic recourse 
in some fashion guarantees the return to the purchaser without regard to 
the economic characteristics of the transferred asset. In the truest sense of 
the word, the transferred asset serves merely as collateral, as its own fi-
nancial characteristics do not serve to define the economic terms of the 
transaction. Transfers with economic recourse look and smell like loans, 
and because enforcing important state law policies-like prohibiting 
usury-turned on determining the appropriate characterization of trans-
42. Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. 103, III (1833) (finding that the sale ofa note at discount 
with recourse to the indorser was a sale not a loan). 
43. See irifra text accompanying notes 81-86. 
44. See, e.g., Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 546 (3d 
Cir. 1979) (interpreting sale agreement to allow retroactive changes in the discount for prior 
purchases to track movements in the prime rate). Although a fixed rate lender may not be 
able to adjust its return after its loan is made, it still may be able to protect itself against 
market value erosion in ways that a buyer cannot. See irifra note 85. 
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actions, courts historically have had little hesitation recharacterizing such 
transfers as loans.45 
45. Economic recourse does not mean that the buyer's return on the asset sold has to 
equal what the seller's return would have been absent the sale. Obviously, a buyer who buys 
receivables at a discount would earn an overall rate of return on the receivables greater than 
that which would have been earned by the seller had no sale occurred. The buyer's return 
would be a function of the purchase price discount and the subsequent cash flows generated 
by the receivables. Even if the buyer has recourse to the seller, so long as recourse was limited 
to collectibility, it would not alter the return the buyer would otherwise earn if the receivables 
were to collect in accordance with their terms. This type of recourse should not turn the sale 
into a loan. 
Economic recourse also does not mean that the buyer and the seller could not agree to 
an arrangement, such as an interest rate swap, structured to pay the buyer a floating rate 
return from a fixed rate investment or vice-versa. For instance, if the buyer of a pool of fixed 
rate receivables thinks interest rates will rise, it may wish to structure the purchase so that it 
earns a floating rate of interest instead of a fixed rate. One way to do this would be to 
purchase a swap from a third party and thus trade a fixed rate for a floating rate. This third-
party arrangement, of course, should have no effect on the true sale nature ofthe underlying 
transaction. 
Similarly, the buyer could also purchase a swap from the seller. Superficially this might 
look like economic recourse because the seller would be liable for a rate of return that differs 
from the return implied from the terms of the receivables sold. It should not, however, 
constitute economic recourse if the swap, in substance, is a separate buy/sell transaction in 
which the seller of the receivable is compensated at a market rate for providing the swap. It 
should also make little difference whether the seller satisfies its obligations under the swap 
directly from its own pocket or, instead, out of any interest it otherwise might have retained 
in the receivables sold. 
Finally, consider a different scenario-one in which the buyer and seller agree to make 
payments to each other not as a result of interest rate changes (as in the case of the swap) 
but instead as a result of differences in the timing of collections on sold receivables from that 
which was anticipated at the time of sale. A more expansive theory of true sale than that set 
forth in this Article would permit the buyer and seller to make these kinds of payments to 
each other so long as the payments were from the cash flows generated from the sale of the 
receivables or the proceeds of collection. 
For instance, under this expansive theory, if a pool of receivables performs more slowly 
than anticipated, the seller may make compensating payments to the purchaser so long as 
the payments are from the proceeds received by the seller from the purchaser in payment of 
the purchase price. In parallel fashion, if the pool of transferred receivables pays more quickly 
than anticipated, the purchaser may make compensating payments to the seller from collec-
tions received by the purchaser on account of the transferred receivables. In either situation, 
the parties are merely reallocating cash flows of a particular transaction to acljust for differ-
ences between what had been anticipated by the parties and what had actually occurred. On 
the other hand, if the seller makes payments in excess of the purchase price, or the purchaser 
makes payments in excess of collections (or payments received on account of collections), the 
adjustments go beyond merely allocating cash flows. Instead, they suggest a level of recourse 
that goes beyond that which would be appropriate in a true sale. 
Admittedly, one could argue that this expansive theory of true sale is ahead of where the 
case law generally is today. A number of the authors, however, believe that it would be 
appropriate and logical for any practical theory of true sale to allow the parties to a sale of 
a financial asset to allocate cash flows between themselves to reflect the economics that had 
been mutually anticipated at the time of sale. Securitization now involves the elaborate re-
configuration of cash flows to accommodate the economic needs of sellers and investors. See 
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Admittedly, not all of the recharacterization cases involving recourse 
can be catalogued into recourse for collectibility (sale) and economic re-
course (loan).46 This distinction between recourse for collectibility and eco-
nomic recourse, however, holds true for a significant number of rechar-
acterization cases, and continues to appear in case law today.47 
For instance, in Goldstein v. Madison National Bank,48 the debtor could not 
pay $201,000 it owed to Madison National Bank. The debtor, however, 
did have an asset-an approximately $1 million receivable owed by one 
of its customers. The bank and the debtor entered into an agreement 
under which the debtor "absolutely assigned" (i.e., sold) $200,000 of the 
receivable to the bank. Once the assignment had been agreed to, the bank 
stopped accruing interest on the debt, and the parties treated the debt as 
extinguished by the transfer. 
The customer paid the receivable. Within one week of this payment, 
but more than ninety days after the original assignment of the receivable, 
the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy 
court, ruling that the payment was not preferential because the assignment 
constituted an absolute assignment and not a secured transaction.49 
It is noteworthy that the court was not troubled that only part of the 
receivable-the right to the first $200,000 of collections of a $1 million 
JASON H. P. KRAVITI', THE SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (1996). The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has recognized the necessity for creating a theory of 
transfers that accommodates the reality of the market place by adopting a new standard to 
apply to securitization, the "financial components approach," applicable to fiscal years be-
ginning after December 31, 1996. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATE-
MENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 125, ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS 
AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES ~ 107 (June 
1996). This approach allows for the reconfiguration of cash flows without disqualifying a 
transfer from being derecognized by the transferor. Rather, the transferor and the transferee 
merely recognize the financial components that each now controls after giving effect to the 
reconfiguration. Id. 
46. According to some cases, recourse, even if just for collectibility, suggests a loan. In 
other cases, a sale with full economic recourse was nonetheless treated as a sale. Compare West 
Pico Furniture Co. v. Pacific Furniture Loans, 2 Cal. 3d 594, 604-06 (1970) (holding assign-
ment of conditional sales contract with recourse was a loan, not a sale because "at all times 
the risk of nonpayment" was borne by the assignor) with Hatoff v. Lemons & Assocs., Inc. 
(In re Lemons & Assocs., Inc.), 67 B.R. 198,201 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1986) (holding assignment 
of mortgage notes treated as a sale notwithstanding court's acknowledgement that purchasers 
were "guaranteed [aJ rate of interest ... regardless of the terms, maturity date or perfor-
mance history of their particular note"). 
47. This distinction even appears in most "risk of loss" cases. See il!fra text accompanying 
note 65. In emphasizing this distinction, the authors do not mean to suggest that the presence 
of any amount of economic recourse should automatically turn a sale into a loan. A number 
of the authors believe that if economic recourse exists in a particular sale transaction, but is 
not material or is qualified in a material fashion, and if there are other indicia of sale, then 
the transaction should qualifY as a sale. 
48. 89 B.R. 274 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1988). 
49. Id. at 277. 
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receivable-had been sold. Instead, as part of its analysis, it referred to 
the case of Lyon v. Ty- Wood Corp. ,50 in which the same question was at issue: 
whether the right to receive the first $25,000 of a $30,000 receivable was 
an absolute assignment or a secured transaction.51 
The Lyon court also found the transaction to be an absolute assignment 
(i.e., a sale).52 The sale of part of a receivable necessarily raises questions 
concerning recourse. So long as the buyer receives the right to the first 
dollars paid with respect to the receivable, the seller retains, as a practical 
matter, some of the risk concerning the value of the receivables. In Goldstein, 
the court specifically recognized and reaffirmed the holding of Major's Fur-
niture Mart: the presence of recourse in a sale transaction will not, without 
more, automatically convert a sale into a secured loan transaction. 53 More-
over, the recourse in Goldstein was purely for collectibility, and not for eco-
nomic recourse. The bank stopped accruing interest upon the sale, the 
account did not bear interest, and the seller did not warrant any particular 
rate of return. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Nebraska Department if 
Revenue v. Loewenstein54 also supports the concept of true sale with recourse 
for collectibility. Loewenstein concerned federal debt securities purchased for 
cash by certain mutual funds under repurchase agreements which later 
obligated the funds to resell the securities to the original owner. Upon 
resale, the funds received an amount equal to the price paid by them for 
the securities "plus interest at an agreed-upon rate that bears no relation 
to the yield on the underlying securities."55 The issue was whether the 
interest paid to the funds was interest on federal government obligations, 
and thus not subject to state income tax, or interest on loans.56 
The funds argued that the transaction was a true purchase and sale, 
and the interest paid should be treated as interest from the securities pur-
chased by the funds. Although the Court specifically declined to address 
whether the securities were actually purchased by the funds,57 it gave sev-
eral reasons for treating the interest paid to the seller as interest on loans. 
First, the interest paid to the buyer bore no relation to the interest paid or 
accrued in the underlying security. Second, upon the seller's default, the 
50. 239 A.2d 819 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968). 
51. Id. at 821. 
52. Id. at 822. 
53. Both Goldstein and Lyon involved transactions in which the receivable was sold in 
exchange for canceling an antecedent debt. Assignments of a single receivable in satisfaction 
of an antecedent debt are expressly excluded from Article 9 by U.C.C. § 9-104(fj (1995). 
Nonetheless, in determining whether a transaction is a true sale or a secured transaction, 
there should be no meaningful distinction drawn between a transfer for antecedent debt and 
a transfer for new value. 
54. 115 S. Ct. 557 (1994). 
55. !d. at 559. 
56. Id. at 561. 
57. Id. at 564. 
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buyer's interest in proceeds would be limited to a return of its investment 
plus its predetermined yield. Third, the seller bore the risk and received 
the upside benefit of change in the market value of the underlying asset. 
Fourth, the seller could "substitute" equivalent securities for the ones ini-
tially purchased by the buyer. 58 
The Court's reasoning is directly in line with the theory of this Article 
as to the distinction between recourse for collectibility and economic re-
course. A sale of a financial asset with recourse for collectibility only, and 
not economic recourse, would bear none of the above characteristics; a 
sale with economic recourse would often bear them all. In a typical case 
of receivables sold with recourse for collectibility59 (i) the buyer's return is 
tied directly to the payment terms of the underlying asset; (ii) upon liqui-
dation, the buyer's interest in proceeds is not limited to this investment 
plus a predetermined rate of return that is unrelated to the underlying 
asset; (iii) only the buyer's interest, not the seller's, is affected by post pur-
chase changes in the asset's market value; and (iv) normally, the seller 
would not have a right to substitute the asset purchased with a new asset.50 
Recourse and "Risk of Loss" Cases 
Several recent cases hold, mistakenly in the authors' view, that a sale 
does not occur unless the buyer assumes the "risk of loss" associated with 
the asset. Even though in most of these cases recharacterization was ap-
propriate because the "buyer" had economic recourse, the rationale of 
these cases, if correct, would preclude true sale treatment for any transfer 
sold with recourse for collectibility. 
In re Executive Growth Investments, Inc.,51 is typical of these kinds of cases. 
The dispute involved an assignment of a fractional interest in a secured 
promissory note. The note was payable to the debtor, Executive Growth 
Investments (EGl), and EGI had assigned its interest in the note with 
58. Id. 
59. See i1!fra text accompanying notes 77-81. 
60. The Supreme Court in Loewenstein noted that the seller was liable for any deficiency 
upon foreclosure. Loewenstein, 115 S. Ct. at 562. A seller who accepts recourse for collectibility 
may also be so liable. The securities in Loewenstein, however, were risk-free federal securities. 
Thus, any loss that the funds might suffer upon foreclosure would be a loss in market value 
due to interest rate changes, not a loss due to a default under the securities themselves. 
Recourse in Loewenstein, therefore, was economic recourse, not recourse for collectibility. 
61. Rechnitzer v. Boyd (In re Executive Growth Invs., Inc.), 40 B.R. 417 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1984); see also In re Lendvest Mortgage, Inc., 119 B.R. 199 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990); Ryan v. 
Zinker (In re Sprint Mortgage Brokers Corp.), 164 B.R. 224 (Bankr. E.D.NY 1994); European 
Am. Bank v. Sackman Mortgage Corp. (In re Sackman Mortgage Corp.), 158 B.R. 926 (Bankr. 
S.D.NY 1993); In re Coronet Capital Co., 142 B.R. 78 (Bankr. S.D.NY 1992); Ables v. 
Major Funding Corp. (In re Major Funding Corp.), 82 B.R. 443 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987); 
Castle Rock Indus. Bank v. S.O.A.W Enter., Inc. (In re S.O.A.W. Enter., Inc.), 32 B.R. 279 
(Bankr. WD. Tex. 1983). 
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recourse to various investors, including a Mrs. Feldman who held an 8.2% 
interest in the note. EGI kept possession of the note. 
After EGI filed bankruptcy, the maker paid the note. The Chapter 7 
trustee argued that the assignment was a loan, not a sale, and that because 
Mrs. Feldman failed to perfect her interest in the note under state law, her 
claim to her share of the proceeds of the note was voidable. 
In order to decide the issue, the court had to decide the parties' inten-
tions.62 According to the court, this meant looking "past the expressed 
intention of the parties ... [to] some purer intention behind the form. "63 
Although the court began its analysis with the HC.C., it noted the absence 
of "any express guidance from the HC.C. "64 and formulated its own test. 
The court asked the question: "[W]ho bears the risk of loss in the event 
of non-payment?"65 The court continued: 
Applying that analysis to the A & W note, I can reframe the question 
in this way: absent bankruptcy, as between the transferor EGI and 
the transferee Mrs. Feldman, who would have borne the loss if the 
note had gone unpaid? And on this issue, I think the record is beyond 
dispute. The agreement specifically provides that the transfer is "with 
recourse." I take that to mean that if the note had proven uncollec-
tible, then the transferee Mrs. Feldman would have recourse against 
the transferor EGl. By express agreement then, EGI bore the risk of 
loss. On the analysis set forth above, I find that EGI made something 
less than an absolute transfer. I thus conclude that Mrs. Feldman can 
have at best no more than a security interest.66 
Although there may have been other reasons to call the sale a 10an,67 
the court relied on a risk of loss analysis to get to this answer. This was 
62. Executive Growth Inv., 40 B.R. at 422. UC.C. Article 9, and its rules of perfection, apply 
"to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest." 
UC.C. § 9-102 (1995). 
63. Executive Growth Inv., 40 B.R. at 422. 
64. Id. 
65. !d. 
66. !d. The court's conclusion was dicta. Under California law, which applied to the 
transaction, a sale of personal property not accompanied by delivery to and possession by 
the buyer is "conclusively presumed fraudulent and void as against the transferor's creditors." 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3440 (1970 & West Supp. 1996). Therefore, as the Executive Growth In-
vestments court recognized, Mrs. Feldman's interest in the note was voidable under the "strong-
arm" provisions of II US.C. § 544(a) (1994), irrespective of whether the transfer was a sale. 
Executive Growth Inv., 40 B.R. at 420. 
67. The court specifically noted, for example, that Mrs. Feldman bargained for a 12% 
annual return and a return of principal at the end of one year. Id. at 422. Although the terms 
of the note in which Mrs. Feldman claimed an interest were not detailed in the opinion, it 
seems that the return to Mrs. Feldman may have had nothing to do with the terms of the 
note and was thus a form of economic recourse. Economic recourse also existed in most 
other "risk ofloss" cases. See Ryan v. Zinker (In re Sprint Mortgage Brokers Corp.), 164 B.R. 
224 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1994); European Am. Bank v. Sackman Mortgage Corp. (In re Sackman 
Rethinking the Role of Recourse 177 
wrong. Prior case law has recognized that one could have a true sale with 
recourse for collectibility.68 Moreover, the u.e.e., the starting point in the 
court's analysis, makes it clear that "there may be a true sale of accounts 
or chattel paper ... although recourse exists. "69 
Finally, consider the result had EGI not assigned undivided interests in 
the note to several investors with recourse, but simply assigned all of its 
interest with recourse to one investor. The transfer of a negotiable instru-
ment (a check, a note, or a draft) in the ordinary course of commerce is 
customarily accomplished by indorsement and delivery.70 As a general 
rule, when a seller indorses a negotiable instrument over to a buyer, it does 
so with full recourse. 7 1 The nature of recourse that arises upon indorse-
ment is similar to the liability of a guarantor and to that of one who sells 
Mortgage Corp.), 158 B.R. 926 (Bankr. S.D.N.V 1993); Ables v. Major Funding Corp. (In re 
Major Funding Corp.), 82 B.R. 433 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987); Castle Rock Indus. Bank v. 
S.O.A.W Enter., Inc. (In re S.O.A.w, Enter., Inc.), 32 B.R. 279 (Bankr. w,n. Tex. 1983). In 
each of the foregoing cases, the buyer's return was unrelated to the payment terms of the 
asset sold. See supra note 38. In Lendvest, the debtor was obligated to repurchase a note assigned 
with recourse apparently at any time regardless of whether the note was in default. In re 
Lendvest Mortgage, Inc., 119 B.R. 199, 20 I (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990). This indicated economic 
recourse because recourse to the seller was not limited to collectibility. The facts in Coronet 
Capital suggest the presence of economic recourse, but they are too unclear to say for certain. 
The court noted that the participant "was to receive payments of three and one-halfpercent 
above the prime rate of interest with a minimum rate of 15% per year," but did not disclose 
the yield on the underlying loan and whether it differed from the return promised to the 
participant. See In re Coronet Capital Co., 142 B.R. 78, 80 (Bankr. S.D.NY 1992). According 
to the seller's offer to sell a participation in the underlying mortgage loan, however, the 
mortgage loan bore interest at the rate of prime plus five percent with no minimum; accord-
ingly, it was possible, and indeed likely, that if the prime rate decreased to nine and one-half 
percent or below, the mortgage loan would not generate enough interest to meet the 15% 
minimum that had been promised to the participant. The court in Woodl'on relied heavily on 
the fact that interest spread between the underlying mortgage and the yield guaranteed to 
each new participant seemed to change. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Grover (In re Woodson 
Co.), 813 E2d 266, 272 (9th Cir. 1987). Although to the court this may have suggested 
something akin to economic recourse and thus a loan, the yield demanded by each new 
participant (and hence the spread) in a true sale should in reality have changed over time as 
interest rates changed. 
68. See Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 E2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979). 
69. U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 4 (1995) ("The last sentence of subsection (2) therefore preserves 
freedom of contract, and the subsection recognizes that there may be a true sale of accounts, 
or chattel paper, or contract rights although recourse exists."). The fact that the Executive 
Growth Investments court was dealing with a negotiable instrument instead of an account or 
chattel paper is irrelevant. The transfer of negotiable instruments under the U.C.C. is rou-
tinely done with recourse. 
70. "Unless otherwise agreed, if an instrument is transferred for value ... the transferee 
has a specifically enforceable right to the unqualified indorsement of the transferor .... " 
U.C.C. § 3-203(c) (1995). 
71. Lake Hiwassee Dev. Co. v. Pioneer Bank, 535 S.w'2d 323, 326 (Tenn. 1976) (noting 
that when chattel paper or other negotiable instruments are sold, "endorsement with recourse 
is standard procedure in ... state[s] ... that have adopted the [V.C.C.]"). 
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any type of receivable with recourse. 72 The liability is contingent and sec-
ondary: "The term 'with recourse' ... implies the ... result-that the 
drawer, or indorser, or transferor of the document will be liable if the 
document is not honored by the primary obligor."73 
Starting over 160 years ago with the Supreme Court, courts have made 
it clear that having recourse against an indorser does not mean that a sale 
is a loan. This is so even though a seller's indorsement "may well be 
regarded in the light of a guarantee against the insolvency of the promis-
sor."74 
Given that millions of dollars of negotiable instruments are indorsed 
and sold every day with recourse, it is hard to see the wisdom (not to 
mention the consequences) of a per se rule of law that would treat all of 
these sales as loans. Sales of negotiable instruments with recourse is how 
many operate day to day. It would be a shock to all who regularly indorse 
checks if their unrestricted indorsement were to produce a "loan" from 
72. See Mercantile Bank v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 920 F.2d 1539, 1544 (10th 
Cir. I 990),judgment vacated and appeal dismissed, No. 89-3047, 89-3063, 1991 WL 96039 (lOth 
Cir. Mar. 4,1991). 
73. Sticka v. Bestline, Inc. (In re Attaway, Inc.), 180 B.R. 274,278 (Bankr. D. Or. 1995). 
The liability of an indorser ofa negotiable instrument is explained in § 3-415(a) of the UC.C.: 
Subject to subsections (b), (c), (d), and (e) and to § 3-419(d), if an instrument is dishon-
ored, an indorser is obliged to pay the amount due on the instrument (i) according to 
the terms of the instrument at the time it was indorsed, or (ii) if the indorser indorsed 
an incomplete instrument, according to its terms when completed, to the extent stated 
in Sections 3-115 and 3-407. The obligation of the indorser is owed to a person entitled 
to enforce the instrument or to a subsequent indorser who paid the instrument under 
this section. 
UC.C. § 3-4 I 5 (a) (1995). 
74. Nichols v. Fearson, 32 US. 103, 110 (1833); see Lake Hiwassee Dev. Co. v. Pioneer 
Bank, 535 S.W2d 323 (Tenn. 1976); Val Zimmermann Corp. v. Leffingwell, 318 N.W2d 
781 (Wis. 1982). Moreover, even "[t]he presence of a reserve fund is not determinative of 
the question of whether the transaction constituted a loan or sale." Lake Hiwassee, 535 S.W.2d 
at 326. "The establishment of a reserve fund was a valid method whereby the bank insured 
that it would receive payment on the notes endorsed by Lake Hiwassee, and is not sufficient 
to convert an otherwise valid sale into a loan." /d. at 326-27. Some states have enacted laws 
which deem recourse transfers of instruments to be loans for usury purposes. Baxter v. Ste-
vens, 773 P.2d 890 (Wash. 1989). Even in those states, however, business-related transfers are 
generally exempt, and such statutes are recognized as contrary to common law. Cases from 
North Carolina apply usury laws to sales of instruments with recourse, but recognize that 
this position is contrary to usury decisions in other states. See Western Auto Supply Co. v. 
Vick, 277 S.E.2d 360 (N.C.), reh'g granted, 283 S.E.2d 101 (N.C. 1981); see also 6 SAMUEL 
WILUSTON & GEORGE]' THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1689, 
at 4782 (1938) (stating the general rule that "a sale ... though accompanied with a guaranty 
of the value of the article sold ... should not be regarded as within the purview of statutes 
against usury, unless the parties are in fact intending a loan rather than a sale"). Moreover, 
these cases recharacterize sales of negotiable instruments with recourse as loans in order to 
vindicate a policy against usury. They do not stand for the proposition that the sale of every 
note with recourse per se constitutes a loan. 
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the transferee. Yet, holding, as the Executive Growth Investments and other 
courts recently have held, that one cannot have a sale with recourse be-
cause risk of loss remains with the seller would do just that. 75 
RECHARACTERIZATION IS APPROPRIATE ONLY IF THERE 
IS ECONOMIC RECOURSE 
Recourse per se cannot be the controlling issue in determining true sale; 
indeed, many courts have found true sales to exist despite the presence of 
recourse. Rather, as the court in Major's Furniture Mart framed it: "The 
question is ... whether the nature of the recourse, and the true nature ... 
of the transaction, are such that the legal rights and economic conse-
quences of the agreement bear a greater similarity to a financing trans-
action or to a sale. "76 
The court's emphasis on the "nature" of the recourse and its statement 
that "[g]uaranties of ... collectibility alone, might be consistent with true 
sale" place the proper focus on the question of recourse and true sale. 77 
So, too, does the emphasis on "the nature of the transaction" and whether 
the buyer's rights and interests bear "a greater similarity" to a loan than 
a sale. 
A sale with recourse for collectibility is consistent with the concept of 
sale and certainly does not bear a greater similarity to a loan than a sale. 
Sellers of many different types of assets, financial and otherwise, routinely 
75. The law has an interest in encouraging the free transferability of negotiable instru-
ments, and the presumption that an indorser warrants the terms of a negotiable instrument 
serves that purpose. The law, however, also favors the free transferability of accounts. See 
UC.C. § 9-318(4) (1995). While at some level there may be a difference between a negotiable 
instrument and an account, a rule of law that would promote sales of negotiable instruments 
with recourse but effectively prohibit such sales of other assets by applying a "risk of loss" 
standard would make little sense. The funding efficiencies achieved in today's multi-billion 
dollar securitization market suggest that the law should have a compelling interest in en-
couraging the free transferability of all kinds of financial assets. 
76. Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538,544 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(footnote omitted). In a footnote, the court noted that Gilmore "would place almost con-
trolling significance on the one factor of recourse." !d. at 545 n.12. The court's statement 
was based upon the following Gilmore quote: 
If there is no right of charge-back or recourse with respect to uncollectible accounts and 
no right to claim for a deficiency, then the transaction should be held to be a sale, 
entirely outside the scope of Part 5. If there is a right to charge back uncollectible 
accounts (a right, as § 9-502 puts it, of "full or limited recourse") or a right to claim a 
deficiency, then the transaction should be held to be for security and thus subject to 
Part 5 as well as the other Parts of the Article. 
2 GIlMORE, supra note II, § 44.4, at 1230. For a good discussion of the Gilmore quote and 
why it does not mean what it seems to say, see Plank, supra note 5, at 320-22. 
77. Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 545 (quoting Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle 
Credit Corp., 449 F. Supp. 538, 543 (E.D. Pa. 1978)). 
180 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 52, November 1996 
warrant the future performance of the asset sold. 78 Moreover, in some 
situations, a buyer with recourse for collectibility only and not economic 
recourse assumes risks that a lender would not. 
Take the simple case of a buyer of a pool of noninterest bearing trade 
receivables. Assume the buyer purchases the pool at a discount which 
contemplates an average collection rate of thirty-five days. If, on average, 
the receivables actually collect in full in forty days, the buyer's yield would 
be less than expected, although the assets would have performed as prom-
ised (i.e., the receivables collected ultimately in full). A buyer with recourse 
for collectibility would have no claim against the seller. A buyer with eco-
nomic recourse, however, would. In that situation, even though the obligor 
paid in full, the buyer would have the right to recover without limit the 
rest of its expected yield from the seller and the transaction would be 
economically indistinguishable from a loan. Economic recourse not only 
protects the buyer's interest in the asset (which would be consistent with a 
sale) but also the buyer's interest in receiving a predetermined rate of 
return which bears no direct relationship to the asset itself. 79 The buyer's 
risk in the transaction is reduced to that of a lender.8o 
78. For a discussion of the role of recourse in the sale of other property, see Plank, supra 
note 5, at 339-43; see also U.C.C. § 3-414 (1995) (stating indorser's liability upon sale of a 
negotiable instrument). The fact that recourse for collectibility may be consistent with both 
the concept of loan and sale does not mean that its presence mandates the treatment of a 
transaction as a loan. See A.B. Lewis Co. v. National Invs. Corp. of Houston, 421 S.W2d. 
723,728 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967); if. Cohen v. Army Moral Support Fund (In re Bevill), 67 B.R. 
557 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1986). The court noted: 
The mere presence of secured loan characteristics in repo and reverse repo agreements 
is not enough to negate the parties' voluntary decision to structure the transaction as 
purchases and sales. There is nothing in Article 2 of the U.C.C. governing sales which 
would preclude parties from incorporating terms which are common features of colla-
teralized loans into agreements which otherwise have legitimate attributes of a purchase 
and sale. 
!d. at 598. 
79. Interest in a situation like the one described above would be set at a rate that reflects 
two things: the risk that the asset would not perform as promised (default risk) and risk of 
loss associated with the time value of money (arising as a result of lost opportunity and 
inflation). See Peter V. Pantaleo & Barry W Ridings, Reorganization Value, 51 Bus. LAw. 419, 
430 n.4l (1996). Default risk is directly related to the quality of the asset sold because it can 
be eliminated if the asset collects in full. The risk ofloss for the time value of money, however, 
is not necessarily eliminated if the asset collects in full and thus is a risk that reflects a potential 
loss that is unrelated to the quality of the asset sold. A buyer of non interest-bearing receivables 
with recourse for collectibility tries to eliminate default risk by assuring itself of the quality 
of the asset it buys. A buyer with economic recourse goes beyond this by trying to eliminate 
risk not associated with the asset but with the time value of money-an investment risk real 
buyers often assume and lenders never do. 
80. As discussed above, often courts recharacterize sales as loans if, in addition to recourse 
that eliminates all risk to the buyer (including economic risk), the seller also retains the right 
to any surplus collections, a right also typically associated with a loan and not a true sale. See 
Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand 
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If the terms of the receivables were such that the obligors were con-
tractually bound to pay, on average, within thirty-five days, a buyer might 
attempt to lock in its return because, in that instance, a warranty of col-
lectibility arguably would mean collectibility in full and on a timely basis. 
In such a case, the discount applied to the purchase can be calculated to 
assure a return based upon collections within thirty-five days, or payment 
in lieu of such collections by the seller. Of course, in many situations in-
volving trade receivables, a warranty like this could not be given because 
there is often no fixed payment date for a trade receivable.8l Instead, 
payment within a broader time period may be all that is required, based 
upon the course of dealing between the parties or the custom in the in-
dustry.82 If the account party was clearly obligated to pay by a certain date, 
however, or if finance charges accrued on the account, a warranty of col-
lectibility would insure payment of principal on a timely basis and thus a 
rate of return to the buyer. 
This scenario obviously presents a more difficult question of true sale 
than the earlier illustration involving the pool of receivables that collect 
five days late. In the earlier illustration, the buyer suffers real economic 
loss, even with recourse, that a lender never does, and so a true sale de-
termination clearly seems appropriate. In this scenario, the buyer might 
suffer no loss,83 yet the transfer would be a true sale because (i) recourse 
for the buyer's return is contingent upon, and not independent of, the 
collectibility of the asset purchased;84 (ii) there is still a potential for loss in 
Union Co. 219 F. 353 (2d Cir. 1914). In nearly all of those cases, however, economic recourse 
was an element of the transaction. Surplus is effectively defined as whatever is collected by 
the buyer above a predetermined rate of return unrelated to the payment characteristics of 
the asset sold. Transactions in which the buyer did not have economic recourse have been 
treated as sales despite the fact that the seller was entitled to collections after a specified 
amount was received by the buyer. See generally Goldstein v. Madison Nat'l Bank, 89 B.R. 
274 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1988); Coast Fin. Corp. v. Ira F. Powers Furniture Co., 209 P. 614 (Or. 
1922); see also Steven Schwarcz, A New Theory qf Recourse, ASSET SALE REP., Feb. 14, 1994, 
at 8. 
81. See Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 163 P.2d 869 (1945) (finding no sale when, among 
other things, seller of accounts guaranteed payments within specified periods not correspond-
ing to the maturity dates of the accounts). 
82. See Frank Novak & Sons, Inc. v. Sommer & MACA Indus., 538 N.E.2d 700 (Ill. 1989) 
(time of payment for goods delivered may be determined by parties' agreement as reflected 
in "course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance"); if. Brownie's Army & 
Navy Store, Inc. v. EJ. Burke,Jr., Inc., 424 N.YS.2d 800, 803, 28 HC.C. Rep. Servo (Cal-
laghan) 90, 93 (Sup. Ct. 1980) ("The custom and practice of the parties can affect the 
imposition of interest. The evidence here is that plaintiff never expected his customer to pay 
interest unless the account was very 'late.' "). 
83. This assumes, of course, that the market value of the obligation purchased did not 
deteriorate as a result of a change in interest rates or the credit-worthiness of the seller or 
the underlying obligor. 
84. In Major's Furniture Mart, for example, the Third Circuit stressed that the buyer had 
recourse to compel the seller to repurchase accounts under certain circumstances regardless 
of whether the obligor defaulted. Major's Furniture Mart, 602 F.2d at 545. 
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market value to the buyer if interest rates rise after the purchase or if the 
credit-worthiness of the underlying obligor or the seller deteriorates;85 and 
(iii) the buyer would still enjoy the upside of ownership were the account 
to collect early. 86 
A SALE THAT WOUW NOT BE RECHARACTERIZED 
UNDER STATE LA W SHOUW BE ENFORCED UNDER 
BANKRUPTCY LA W 
Property Rights in Bankruptcy Are Governed By State Law 
Two fundamental policies underlie bankruptcy law: equality of treat-
ment for creditors and rehabilitation for the debtor. Whether a transfer of 
assets is a true sale is often an issue in bankruptcy cases because the answer 
can impact these policies. If a debtor's prepetition sale of property is a true 
sale, then the property is no longer part of the debtor's estate in bankruptcy 
and the buyer's rights in the property are not subject to the automatic stay. 
As a result, the property cannot be used by the debtor either for reorga-
nization or as a source of value for paying its creditors. 
These bankruptcy policies often compel a court to examine issues of 
true sale, and compel courts to do so independently of concerns about 
usury, fraud, or other matters of state law (although a bankruptcy court 
will be concerned about those issues as well). But while bankruptcy policies 
lead bankruptcy courts to examine whether a sale is in fact a true sale, 
bankruptcy courts must apply state law in order to come to the answer. Questions in 
bankruptcy over ownership of property can only be answered by applying 
state law, even if the answer yields an unfortunate result for a debtor and 
its creditors. In Butner v. United States,87 a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court 
adopted the view, already held by the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
85. In Major's Furniture Mart, the court interpreted the transaction to conclude that the 
"buyer," Castle, was able to protect itself against "any conceivable loss" by unilaterally ad-
justing the interest rate payable by the seller in respect of purchased loans. Making this kind 
of adjustment would help to assure a market return for the buyer. Major's Furniture Mart, 602 
F.2d at 546. The court's interpretation, however, was wrong. The buyer did announce uni-
laterally that the discount rate for loans purchased after a certain date would float based on 
the prime rate; the court's own review of a typical transaction reveals, however, that the 
discount was applied only at the purchase of a loan; after the loan was purchased, there was 
no floating or fluctuating interest charged with respect to that loan. [d. at 540-41. Moreover, 
the seller acquiesced in the pricing change since it continued to sell loans to Castle. A more 
significant indication of a secured loan transaction was the fact that Castle was also able to 
force Major's Furniture Mart to repurchase accounts if Major's defaulted upon its agreement 
with Castle or went out of business even if the accounts were not in default. Castle was 
therefore able to protect the market value of its investment much like any lender who relies 
on financial or otherwise covenant protection to compel immediate repayment if the bor-
rower's condition or the collateral deteriorates. 
86. See Chase & Baker Co. v. National Trust & Credit Co., 215 F. 633 (N.D. Ill. 1914). 
87. 440 U.S. 48 (1979). 
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Ninth Circuits, that property rights are determined by state law even in a 
bankruptcy proceeding: 
Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some 
federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such 
interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested 
party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding .... The justifications 
for application of state law are not limited to ownership interests; they 
apply with equal force to security interests .... 88 
In Butner, the Court reasoned that "[u]niform treatment of property 
interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce 
uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from 
receiving 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bank-
ruptcy.' "89 
According to Butner, state property rights can be overridden only by a 
federal statute or interest. The Court, however, did not define what con-
stitutes a federal interest that would allow a bankruptcy court to override 
state law and to modify property rights. Courts, when using the federal 
interest exception in Butner, often rely on the congressional goal of en-
couraging reorganizations in conjunction with a specific Bankruptcy Code 
section which plainly demonstrates a federal interest that overrides state 
law rights.90 For instance, in In re Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc.,91 the bankruptcy 
court determined that a specific Bankruptcy Code provision, section 
506(b), manifested a sufficient federal interest to supersede state law rights 
in connection with a mortgage provision. In that case, a junior secured 
creditor sought to purchase the senior secured creditor's mortgage. A dis-
pute arose over the amount of attorneys' fees the senior creditor would be 
entitled to receive based upon the debtor's default. Although the note in 
question provided for fifteen percent of the outstanding principal balance 
as the amount of attorneys' fees, the court determined the amount of 
attorneys' fees under section 506(b) and did not regard the fifteen percent 
provision as determinative.92 The court awarded $30,000 as reasonable 
attorneys' fees rather than fifteen percent of the balance due on the note, 
which would have been $190,000.93 The Fifth Circuit held: "Congress has 
clearly chosen to exercise its broad power to establish a uniform rule re-
specting the existence and extent of a right by enacting § 506(b). Accord-
88. Id. at 55 (citation omitted). 
89. Id. (citing Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 365 U.S. 603 (1961)). 
90. See Olathe, Kansas v. KAR Dev. Assocs., L.P. (In re KAR Dev. Assocs., L.P.), 180 B.R. 
629 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995); In re Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell, 148 B.R. 660 (Bankr. 
D.D.C. 1992). 
91. Blackburn-Bliss Trust v. Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc. (In re Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc.), 
794 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1986). 
92. Id. at 1055. 
93. /d. at 1058-59 
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ingly, the holding in Butner is not applicable. Here, a paramount federal 
interest dictates that federal law shall govern."94 
Admittedly, notwithstanding illustrative cases like Hudson Shipbuilders, 
there is no ready rule of law that enables one to determine whether, in a 
given dispute in a bankruptcy proceeding, a "paramount federal interest" 
is implicated such that federal law, and not state law, governs the parties' 
rights. Nonetheless, it seems clear that if the "federal interest" exception 
is not to swallow the rule, a bankruptcy court's perception of equity, stand-
ing alone, should not constitute an identifiable federal interest that would 
override state law rights, even for the sake of promoting reorganization or 
fostering equality among creditors. In Butner, for instance, the Court made 
it clear that generalized notions of equity cannot replace state law rights: 
The minority of courts which have rejected state law have not done 
so because of any congressional command or because their approach 
serves any identifiable federal interest. Rather, they have adopted a 
uniform federal approach to the question of the mortgagee's interest 
in rents and profits because of their perception of the demands of 
equity. The equity powers of the bankruptcy court play an important 
part in the administration of bankrupt estates in countless situations 
in which the judge is required to deal with particular, individualized 
problems. But undifined considerations if equity provide no basis for adoption 
if a uniform .federal rule qjfOrding mortgagees an automatic interest in the rents 
as soon as the mortgagor is declared bankrupt.95 
Indeed, prior to Butner, the Seventh Circuit, contrary to the overwhelm-
ing majority of circuits, had established a doctrine that allowed bankruptcy 
courts to alter entitlements in order to achieve more equitable treatment 
of creditors.96 Butner, however, "expressly rejected [this] doctrine."97 
94. !d. at 1058. 
95. Butner v. United States, 440 US. 48, 55 (1978) (emphasis added); see BFP v. Resolution 
Trust Corp., 511 US. 531 (1994); Amdura Nat'l Distrib. Co. v. Amdura Corp. (In re Amdura 
Corp.), 75 F.3d 1447 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding state law determines property rights in bank-
ruptcy); Dewhirst v. Citibank (Arizona) (In re Contractors Equip. Supply Co.), 861 F.2d 241 
(9th Cir. 1988) (finding state law determines what constitutes property of the estate under II 
US.C. § 541). 
96. See Boston and Maine Corp. v. Chicago Pac. Corp., 785 F.2d 562, 566 (7th Cir. 1986). 
97. Id. at 566; see also Union Pac. R.R. v. Moritz (In re Iowa R.R.), 840 F.2d 535, 536-37 
(7th Cir. 1988) ("[P]roperty rights are defined in most cases by state law. When they are so 
defined, the bankruptcy court must implement rather than alter them. "); In re Chicago, 
Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pac. R.R., 791 F.2d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Bankruptcy law 
provides a federal machinery for enforcing creditors' rights but the rights themselves are 
created by state law."); Kham & Nate's Shoes No.2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1361 
(7th Cir. 1990) (" [B] ankruptcy judges no longer have equitable powers to modify contracts 
to achieve 'fair' distributions. Bankruptcy judges enforce entitlement created under state 
law."); accord Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 US. 197 (1988); Official Comm. of 
Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1987); see also In re Contractors Equip. 
Supply Co., 861 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating in a dispute over whether the debtor 
had an interest in the receivable, "whether a debtor-in-possession has an interest in property 
is determined by state law"). 
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Applying state law principles (e.g., the right to purchase or sell an asset 
with recourse for collectibility) to decide true sale issues in bankruptcy cases 
makes sense.98 As noted, equal treatment for creditors and debtor reha-
bilitation are the two major bankruptcy goals. Neither goal, however, is so 
threatened by the concept of a true sale with recourse for collectibility as 
to require courts to create federal common law and ignore state law rights. 
For example, a sale of financial assets, with or without recourse for 
collectibility, does not offend the policy of equitable distribution. There is 
no preference issue in a sale of financial assets because no debtor-creditor 
relationship exists. There is no debt and therefore no possibility of a pref-
erence.99 Even if the sale were treated as a loan there would be no pref-
erence issue. The sale of financial assets is typically a contemporaneous 
exchange in which the buyer buys the assets for cash. As a contempora-
neous transaction, the transfer of financial assets would not be a prefer-
ence, even if characterized as a loan, because there is no antecedent debt. 
The payment on those assets also would not be preferential (assuming, 
again, that the transferor took the required steps to perfect its interest in 
the assets) because the buyer receives no more when the assets collect than 
it would receive in a liquidation of the debtor, regardless of whether one 
calls the transfer a sale or a secured loan. 100 
Similarly, in an arm's-length transaction, a sale of financial assets, with 
or without recourse, should not be a fraudulent conveyance. 101 There 
rarely will be a basis for asserting actual fraud in a typical structured 
finance transaction. If anything, the transaction is intended to benefit the 
debtor and its creditors by enabling the debtor to liquidate assets in a 
highly efficient manner. Also, there rarely will be a basis for asserting 
constructive fraud because the buyer of financial assets normally will have 
paid reasonably equivalent value for the assets. The mere conversion of 
longer term assets into cash, at a reasonably equivalent value without any 
indicia of fraud or wrongful dealing, is not a fraudulent transfer. Even if it 
98. See Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits qf Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REv. 487, 
559-81 (1996) (noting that, although Congress's power under the Constitution to enact bank-
ruptcy laws allows it to adjust the state law rights of insolvent debtors and their creditors, a 
bankruptcy law may not constitutionally impair the state law rights of third parties, that is, 
those who are neither insolvent debtors nor their creditors-including the property rights of 
those who buy property from the insolvent debtor). 
99. Generally speaking, a preference is a transfer to or for the benefit of a creditor made 
by an insolvent debtor within 90 days prior to bankruptcy in reduction of an antecedent debt 
that enables a creditor to receive more on its debt than it would have received in a Chapter 
7 liquidation absent the transfer. II U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994). 
100. Of course, if the sale is with recourse and, as a result, the seller has to pay the buyer 
for a shortfall in collection, the payment might be preferential. Whether the payment is or 
is not preferential does not turn on whether the sale is a true sale (with recourse) or a secured 
loan (with recourse). 
101. Generally speaking, a fraudulent conveyance is a transfer by an insolvent debtor for 
less than reasonably equivalent value or by a debtor with the intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud its creditors. II U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994). 
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were, the voidability of the transfer would not depend on its characteriza-
tion as either a sale or a loan. 102 
Finally, as a practical matter, recharacterizing a sale with recourse for 
collectibility (or even economic recourse) as a loan will not result in any 
significant increased distribution to unsecured creditors. In most cases, the 
buyer would have filed UC.C. financing statements and would be entitled 
to the cash flow from the asset ahead of unsecured creditors, to pay back 
its investment plus interest. 103 In cases like Executive Growth Investments, in 
which recharacterization turned a sale into an unsecured loan, recharac-
terization vindicated no independent bankruptcy policy. It simply reflected 
the court's belief that Mrs. Feldman intended a loan and underscored the 
significance of Mrs. Feldman's failure to protect herself by taking the nec-
essary steps that state law, not bankruptcy law, required her to take in 
order to perfect her interest in the note assigned to her. Had Mrs. Feldman 
perfected her interest under state law, then, regardless of what the bank-
ruptcy court thought of the parties' true intentions, the trustee probably 
would have been required to pay Mrs. Feldman her share of the note 
proceeds, just as if she had owned them outright. 
Of course, in a reorganization case, the financial assets of a business are 
often a prime source of collateral for debtor-in-possession financing. A 
trustee or debtor in possession might wish to undo a structured finance 
deal entered into prior to the commencement of the case in order to have 
available those assets to secure debtor-in-possession financing. Recharac-
terization of a sale transaction as a loan may permit the debtor to use the 
cash collections to assist in its reorganization if it gives adequate protec-
tion. l04 Furthermore, because the automatic stay applies to loan collateral 
but not to sold assets, recharacterization would suspend enforcement rights 
and might result in a negotiated compromise of the secured claim. 105 
Therefore, in some cases, even if a trustee or debtor cannot entirely avoid 
102. Admittedly, it is easier for a debtor to dissipate or divert cash than it is to dispose of 
financial assets. One might argue that the conversion of financial assets into the more easily 
disposable cash itself represents a fraudulent transfer if the debtor tries to defraud its creditors 
by then hiding the cash. Such an approach, however, could as easily be applied to a broad 
range of transactions, including tangible asset sales and secured financings. This would make 
it virtually impossible for financially troubled debtors ever to obtain financing for continuing 
operations. So long as a buyer or creditor pays fair value for the assets transferred, and there 
is no clear separate indicia of fraud (or, to be precise, fraud of which the transferee is or 
should be aware), the mere conversion of longer term financial assets into cash should not 
be viewed as a basis for fraudulent transfer attack. Moreover, whether the transfer is a sale 
or a loan is irrelevant to this issue. 
103. Interest would include post-petition interest to the extent proceeds exceed the prin-
cipal amount of the buyer's investment plus accrued interest or of the bankruptcy. 11 US.C. 
§ 506(a) (1994). In most securitizations, proceeds would be expected to cover postpetition 
interest in the event of recharacterization. 
104. Cj II US.C. § 363 (1994). 
105. Cj II US.C. § I I 29(a)(7), (b)(2)(A) (1994). 
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an interest in an asset, the estate might benefit from simply recharacter-
izing that interest as a secured claim rather than an ownership interest. 
Nonetheless, the fact that recharacterization may assist the debtor's re-
habilitation does not mean that a bankruptcy court can reform a bona fide 
state law sales contract, particularly in cases in which the proceeds of the 
sale of financial assets may have provided liquidity to help a debtor stave 
off an earlier bankruptcy filing (and where the impact of such reformation 
may be to inhibit other companies from undertaking transactions that 
could allow sufficient liquidity to avoid bankruptcy altogether). Courts his-
torically have recharacterized transactions under state law that were struc-
tured as sales to evade laws or frustrate public policy. 106 In a Chapter 11 
case, recharacterizing a sale as a loan may, to some degree, enhance a 
debtor's prospects for rehabilitation. Indeed, this would be true regardless 
of whether the buyer had recourse to the seller. The fact that it would be 
better for a debtor to turn a sale into a loan, however, is not, by itself, 
enough to override the state law rights of the buyer. 
For instance, in In re CIS Corp.,107 a trustee in bankruptcy argued that a 
bankruptcy court had the power to recharacterize a lease as a secured 
financing under section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code. The district court 
rejected the trustee's argument, specifically noting that a recharacteriza-
tion case "generally involves application of principles of contract interpre-
tation" that turn on state law causes of action. lOB According to the court, 
section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code did not provide an independent basis 
to recharacterize the lease. "That provision merely provides the court with 
equitable powers to further the substantive provisions of the code, it does 
not empower the court to create a cause of action otherwise unavailable 
under the bankruptcy code."I09 
106. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14. In some cases, the issue may be over who 
gets to keep the surplus proceeds (i.e., the proceeds in excess of the transferee's investment 
plus yield). Ordinarily, if the transfer were a sale, the transferee would keep them; if it were 
a loan, the surplus proceeds would be paid to the transferor. HC.C. § 9-502(2); see supra text 
accompanying note 15. Therefore, if the amount of surplus is significant, the outcome of a 
recharacterization dispute could have real economic consequences to a transferor in bank-
ruptcy. Even so, it still seems that the fundamental question of whether a transfer is a sale or 
a loan should be governed by state law, especially where the point of the question is to decide 
a state law entitlement to surplus. 
107. Hasset v. Bancohio Nat'l Bank (In re CIS Corp.), 172 B.R. 748 (Bankr. S.D.N.V. 
1994). 
108. Id. at 756. 
109. Id. at 757. In support of its holding, the court noted the following cases: 
Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 E2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that § 105 
did not give bankruptcy court authority to create a lien to secure payment of environ-
mental cleanup costs when the contract obligating the debtor to pay such costs did not 
provide for such a lien); United States v. Sutton, 786 E2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding 
that bankruptcy court did not have power under § 105 to authorize monthly allowance 
for support of debtor's spouse who did not have a matured claim for support when 
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The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in In re Jason Realty, Ito 
a case that determined whether an assignment of rents to a mortgagor 
constituted an absolute assignment or a security interest. Citing Butner, the 
Third Circuit viewed the issue as one solely of New Jersey state law, un-
affected by the bankruptcy court's equitable powers. I I I Indeed, the court 
so stated in recognition of the potentially harmful consequences to the 
debtor under state law: 
Although our decision here may create serious obstacles for debtors 
whose sole income stream is rents, Butner mandates that we interpret 
the assignment as New Jersey courts would construe it outside the 
bankruptcy context . 
. . . It is important in interpreting New Jersey law that the otherwise 
worthy desire for achieving a reorganization under Chapter 11 should 
not trump the rights of an assignee of a lease under a pre-petition 
assignment. I 12 
petition was filed; court noted that § 105 does not "constitute a roving commission to 
do equity"); In re Charles & Lillian Brown's Hotel, Inc., 93 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 
1988) ("§ I 05(a) does not create substantive rights otherwise unavailable or grant the 
bankruptcy court an unrestricted license to do equity"). 
/d. Not all of the cases involving whether a lease is a true lease or a secured loan view the 
issue as one of state law. See, e.g., Olathe, Kansas v. KAR Dev. Assocs. L.P. (In re KAR Dev. 
Assocs. L.P.), 180 B.R. 629 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995), and cases cited therein. Whether state or 
federal law should determine whether, in bankruptcy, a lease of real or personal property is 
a true lease is beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth noting an important difference, 
however, between a lease of property and a sale of a financial asset with recourse. If the lease 
transaction is truly a secured loan, then the lessee's bankruptcy payments to the transferee 
would be limited to the value of the collateral. See II US.C. §§ 506(a), I I 29(b) (1994). If the 
lease is treated as a true lease, the lease itself, if assumed, would dictate the amount, timing, 
and other terms of the payments regardless of the value of leased property. See id. §§ 365(a), 
(b), I I 23(b)(2). This difference in treatment could create a windfall for a transferee clever 
enough to disguise a loan as a lease. The recourse claim of the transferee of a financial asset, 
on the other hand, would be entitled to full payment only if fully collateralized. Moreover, 
the payment terms, unlike the terms of an assumed lease, could be restructured under a plan. 
See id. § I I 29(b). 
110. First Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Jason Realty, L.P. (In re Jason Realty, L.P.), 59 F.3d 423 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
III. Id.at427. 
112. /d. at 429-30; see Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 US. 197, 206 (1988) 
("[W]hatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only be ex-
ercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code."); Kham & Nate's Shoes No.2, Inc. v. 
First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1361 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[B]ankruptcy judges no longer have eq-
uitable powers to modify contracts to achieve 'fair' distributions. Bankruptcy judges [now 
must] enforce entitlements created under state law." (citing Butner v. United States, 400 US. 
48 (1979)); Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989); Union Pac. 
R.R. v. Moritz (In re Iowa R.R.), 840 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1988). 
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In Jason Realty, the issue was whether, in an assignment of rents, the 
assignee owned the rents or merely had a security interest in them. 113 
Similar issues are raised in true sale cases involving financial assets. Al-
though in those cases, too, bankruptcy courts might be tempted to rely 
upon equity and ignore state law principles, whether a sale is a true sale 
can only be answered by looking ultimately at state law and respecting 
state law rights. To ignore state law rights and create a separate body of 
federal common law instead would increase uncertainty-a consequence 
of bad, not good, bankruptcy law. I 14 It also would undermine the law's 
interest in preserving reasonable commercial expectations that insure ef-
ficiency and predictability in the marketplace. I IS 
Recognizing Sales with Recourse for Collectibility 
Pro7notes Efficiency and Predictability 
Recognizing that one can have a true sale of financial assets even with 
recourse for collectibility creates both transactional efficiency and pre-
dictability in the credit markets, and, as a result, lowers the cost of credit. 
Transactions are more efficient because a seller is better able to assess the 
risk of assets it originates and, as a result, can minimize the extent to which 
it discounts the asset's sale price and thus maximize sale proceeds. 
The reason why the seller will provide credit recourse is to maximize 
her sale proceeds. As an example, suppose that an originator holds a 
pool ofloans with a face amount of$l,OOO,OOO. She knows the credit 
quality of the loans, and therefore she can predict a probable 1 % loss 
on this pool over the life of the loans. A potential buyer is not as 
confident about the credit quality of the loans, and may be willing to 
pay only 97 % of the face amount of the loans without any recourse. 
He may, however, be willing to pay 100% if the seller guarantees that 
he will suffer no losses from default. By providing this recourse, the 
seller can receive $30,000 more in sale proceeds in exchange for a 
contingent liability that she estimates will be 1 %, or $10,000, over 
113. Jason Realty, 59 E3d at 425. 
114. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 55. 
115. This does not mean that, unless a transaction actually violated state law, a bankruptcy 
court could not recharacterize a sale as a loan. Obviously a "sale" with significant economic 
recourse and no other material characteristics of a sale, even if not usurious or otherwise 
illegal under state law, should nonetheless be recharacterized in bankruptcy. There is no 
reason to respect the transaction as a sale in bankruptcy if recharacterizing it as a loan would 
in any way facilitate a debtor's rehabilitation, so long as state law principles that generally 
apply in recharacterization cases are applied in bankruptcy. This means recognizing that, 
under state law, a buyer has the right to bargain for a sale with recourse for collectibility, and 
it means enforcing his bargain in bankruptcy. 
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the life of the loans. For accounting purposes, she will treat this trans-
action as a sale, and her sale proceeds will equal $990,000. 116 
Transactions would become more predictable because buyers would not 
have to wonder how much recourse is "too much" recourse and wed 
themselves in every transaction to potentially more complicated and ex-
pensive two-tiered structures in order to accomplish a true sale. I 17 
Creating efficiencies is good legal policy. I 18 In fact, the efficiency created 
by permitting a sale of a financial asset with recourse for collectibility is 
no different than that created when a seller gives a warranty of quality in 
the sale of any asset. Virtually every type of asset sale is accompanied by 
representations and warranties as to origin, quality, condition, and similar 
attributes. Such warranties serve not only to assure the buyer that it will 
receive what was bargained for, but also as a mechanism for allocating risk 
when it is difficult or impossible for the buyer to ascertain certain facts. 
For a transaction to be economically feasible, often the seller must allocate 
these risks to itself 
Each material term of a contract maximizes the expected value of 
the contract by sharing risk, reducing risk, or allocating risk. ... 
. . . [0] ne party may rationally accept all risk related to an event 
if that party is in a position to prevent the risk and if the costs of 
shifting the risk to the other party render further negotiation ineffi-
cient. 119 
For example, the seller of real property previously used as a gas station 
may represent and warrant to the buyer that the property is free and clear 
of all environmental risks. It is a risk that the seller, who may have knowl-
edge of the property's prior use over many years, is comfortable in assum-
ing or, at least, is in a better position than the buyer to assess. Unless the 
seller makes such warranty, the buyer may decide not to proceed. 
Certain warranties of quality relating to accounts deal with the proba-
bility of default by third-party obligors. These types of warranties, which 
allocate risk to the seller, are commonly accepted in securitized transac-
tions and, to some extent, are surrogates for warranties of collectibility. 
Take, for example, a seller that warrants to the buyer that all third-party 
obligors on certain consumer receivables have met specified screening cri-
teria. Typically, the seller would warrant that the underlying obligors will 
satisfy certain underwriting standards, that the receivables do not exceed 
116. Plank, supra note 5, at 305; see Robert D. Aicher & William]. Fellerhoff, Characterization 
qf a Transfer qf Receivables as a Sale or a Secured Loan Upon Bankruptcy qf the Transferor, 65 AM. 
BANKR. LJ. 181,209 (1991). 
117. See irifra text accompanying notes 126-28. 
118. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (2d ed. 1977). 
119. Laurie Fisher Humphrey, Difault Rules in the Guaranty Context, 42 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1229, 1249-50 (1992). 
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certain concentration limits, that the receivables are not subject to disputes, 
setoffs, or other noncredit-related reductions, that the obligor has not pre-
viously defaulted on any receivable owing to the seller, and that other 
eligibility criteria have been met. 120 If, however, the seller has not main-
tained uniform origination standards such that this warranty cannot be 
given, will a warranty of collectibility automatically jeopardize the char-
acterization of the transaction as a sale? The seller is in a much better 
position than the buyer to assess risk and may be confident that risk will 
be minimal. If the purchaser is not convinced, however, it may be unwilling 
to proceed unless it receives a warranty of collectibility for all losses-or, 
alternatively, unless the seller discounts the purchase price. The economic 
effect and the necessity for the giving of a warranty of collectibility in that 
situation would often be indistinguishable from a warranty of quality that 
a seller of any asset would give and would permit the transaction and 
encourage economic efficiency. It should not, per se, change the parties' 
characterization of a transaction from a sale to a pledge. 121 To do so would 
be to preclude otherwise economically efficient transactions from occur-
rmg. 
Affording true sale treatment to a sale with recourse for collectibility 
also promotes predictability. The law, including bankruptcy law, values 
commercial predictability, encourages the free transferability of assets, and 
recognizes the direct relationship between predictability and the cost of 
credit. "[LJenders' expectations are central to the calculation of interest 
rates and other terms ofloans, and fulfilling those expectations is therefore 
important to the efficiency of credit markets."122 
Commercial law requires legal certainty. Benjamin N. Cardozo's rec-
ognition of "the overmastering need of certainty in the transactions of 
commercial life" is as apt today as it was over fifty years ago. 123 The need 
for certainty is especially strong when it comes to the sale of financial assets. 
These transactions occur as the result of planning, usually with the assis-
tance of legal counsel. Risks accompanying the transactions are carefully 
evaluated and are reflected in the price of the transaction. Any risk, in-
cluding legal risk, will reduce the value of the asset to either party to the 
120. Some try to distinguish these types of warranties from warranties of collectibility on 
the theory that the former deals with risk arising from circumstances that existed prior to 
sale, the latter with the future risk that the obligor will default. In many transactions that are 
treated unquestionably as a sale, however, the seller warrants against certain types of future 
risk. See Plank, supra note 5, at 339-43. 
121. Id. at 343-46; Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 116, at 210. ("If the effective price paid 
(accounting for all recourse, purchase price holdbacks, overcollateralization with a retained 
seller interest and similar devices) reasonably approximates what a willing buyer would pay 
a willing seller, the court should not decide that such recourse devices require characterization 
of the transactions as a loan. "). 
122. Union Say. Bank v. Augie/Restivo Baking Co. (In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co.), 860 
F.2d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1988). 
123. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, GROWfH OF THE LAw 110 (1924). 
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transaction. Although some legal uncertainty is, in all probability, una-
voidable, unnecessary risk created by unnecessary uncertainty about the 
law is simply an avoidable dead-weight loss to both sides of the deal. 
"[1lhe policies of both contract and property law include creating cer-
tainty and predictability to reduce the parties' planning and transaction 
costs." 124 
The uncertainty caused by In re Twist Cap125 illustrates this problem. 
There, the bankruptcy court temporarily enjoined payment under a letter 
of credit issued prepetition to an unsecured creditor because the issuing 
bank's contingent reimbursement obligation was secured, and, upon draw-
ing, would have become fixed. This result was contrary to the understand-
ing of most lawyers who had contemplated the matter, and almost all of 
them thought that the implication in the case, that a payment under the 
letter of credit might constitute a preference, was wrong. That belief could 
not, however, counteract the doubt the case caused, and the uncertainty 
it created has had substantial effects. 
That case caused chaos in the markets where the parties depend upon 
letters of credit. For example, the credit rating of bond issues some-
times depends upon a letter of credit backing those bonds from a 
bank with stronger credit standing than the issuer. Mter Twist Cap, 
issuers had difficulty getting a favorable rating for fear that a bank-
ruptcy court might enjoin the bank from paying .... Elements of that 
problem have persisted despite the fact that nearly every court that 
has since considered the issue has held there is no preference .... 126 
This confusion concerning the potential consequences in bankruptcy of 
secured letters of credit resulted from a single decision by one trial judge. 
Twist Cap illustrates the economic cost of unpredictable laws. In the secur-
itization market, uncertainty over how much recourse is "too much" re-
course and the concern that one cannot have a true sale with recourse for 
collectibility creates unnecessary cost and uncertainty. Cardozo's lesson still 
needs to be taught. In commercial matters, uncertainty is costly and courts 
must do their utmost to minimize both its amount and degree. 
MARKET APPLICATIONS 
Many securitized transaction structures rely, to some extent, on recourse 
to lower risk and thus lower the cost of credit. Unfortunately, because of 
the existing confusion over recourse and true sale, the amount of recourse 
124. Tamar Frankel, The Legal Inftastructure qf Markets: The Role qf Contract and Property Law, 
73 B.U. L. REV. 389, 395 (1993). 
125. Twist Cap, Inc. v. Southeast Bank (In re Twist Cap, Inc.), I B.R. 284 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1979). 
126. JAMESJ. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-4, 
at 838-39 (4th ed. 1995). 
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in these structures is often unnecessarily limited and is often the cause of 
extensive, and unnecessary, debate and negotiation. The following are ex-
amples of actual or potentially useful market structures that, to varying 
degrees, rely on collectibility recourse to lower credit cost. Although some 
of these structures may go beyond where the market generally is today 
because of existing concerns about recourse and true sale, they are all, in 
the view of the authors, true sales despite the presence of collectibility 
recourse. 
Trade Receivables; Divisible Interest Structure 
A company wishes to raise money by periodically selling its receivables 
to an independent SPY. Assume in a given transaction that the company 
will sell a batch of non-interest bearing receivables with an aggregate face 
amount of $1,000,000. Assume also that the company has the ability to 
make discrete sales of the receivables and identifY and track collections on 
them (in order to avoid commingling concerns), and that the discounts are 
negotiated at arms' length and are not subject to adjustments after the 
purchase occurs. Such a sale might look like this: 
Outstanding balance of receivables in batch 
Yield discount (negotiated and fixed for each 
purchase) [assume based on a 10%127 per annum 
purchaser return, and a 60 day average maturity] 
Servicer discount [payable to servicer] [assume based 
on a 0.50% per annum] 
Purchase Price = outstanding balance minus 
discounts 
Reserves/holdbacks for: 
• defaults (greater of 3 times historical losses and 3 
times concentrations) [assume 9%] 
• Dilution [assume 15%] 
Cash Purchase Price = Purchase Price minus 
reserves/holdbacks 
$1,000,000 
$ 16,667 
$ 833 
$ 982,500 
$ 90,000 
$ 150,000 
$ 742,500 
This transaction would be a true sale under the theory of this Article. 
The purchaser, by accepting a fixed yield discount for each purchase, is 
taking the economic risk that the receivables may collect more slowly than 
anticipated, and also is getting the potential upside in the event the pay-
back is faster. The reserves taken for default and dilution will give the 
buyer protection only for collection risk. They would not mitigate the 
economic risk the buyer accepts as a result of the fixed discount. 128 
127. This includes a profit factor. If the SPY funds itself in the capital markets, the yield 
discount may well be lower. 
128. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 7 (describing this structure in detail). 
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This transaction structure would also dispense with the need for a two-
tier structure, reducing cost and complexity and therefore making it even 
easier, in certain cases, to bring capital market-priced funding to compa-
nies-especially middle market companies. 
Credit Card Receivables; Master Trust 
In a second example, a bank129 may wish to manage its financial ratios 
or match fund its credit card receivables portfolio with liabilities with simi-
lar terms. The selling bank will identify a pool of credit card accounts, 
pursuant to which receivables have been and will be generated. It will 
transfer to a master trust all receivables generated and to be generated by 
the identified accounts, which, in this example, at the time of transfer equal 
approximately $1 million in principal amount. The purchasing trust will 
pay cash equal to the face amount of the receivables for a portion of the 
pool and will issue to the selling bank an undivided, minority interest in 
the pool for the remainder of the pool. It will obtain the cash by selling A, 
B, and C interests in the trust to third parties. A interests will be senior to 
Band C interests, and B interests will be senior to C interests. The A 
interests will equal 85% of the original pool, the B interests 5%, and the 
C interests 10%, respectively. As old receivables collect, the collections will 
be invested in newly generated receivables. If new receivables in excess of 
available collections are generated, the seller's undivided interest in the 
pool will increase to accommodate this fluctuation in the pool's size during 
the reinvestment or "revolving" period. Similarly, the seller's interest will 
decrease if collections exceed new receviables. The seller's interest will be 
129. One might initially question whether the concept of a true sale is relevant for a 
commercial bank. In rated securitizations, commercial banks, thrifts, and other depository 
institutions are not required to effect true sales of their receivables; as a result, the typical 
securitization by such an originator is a one-step sale of the receivables to a trust in which 
the major focus is on the proper perfection of the trust's security interests in the receivables. 
These types of sellers are granted this latitude because the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC), which is the receiver for insolvent depository institutions and has the stat-
utory power to delay foreclosures on property by secured creditors, 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994) 
(roughly analogous to the automatic stay powers granted to a bankruptcy court), has indicated 
that it will not use this power as a receiver to stay foreclosure on assets in which a creditor 
has a properly perfected security interest, provided that certain additional conditions are met. 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., Statement qf Policy on Foreclosure and Redemption Rights, 57 Fed. Reg. 
29,491 (1992). The FDIC's right, however, to repudiate "burdensome" contracts to which a 
failed depository institution is a party, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(I) (1994), gives the FDIC the right 
to, in effect, prepay the obligations secured by the receivables and retake possession of the 
receivables. Such an action would prove harmful to investors in an environment in which 
interest rates had fallen since the issuance of the securities in question because the investors 
might not be able to reinvest their prepaid principal in comparably yielding investments. 
Many lawyers, however, are of the opinion that the requirements of§ 1821(e)(I) do not apply 
to true sales. [d. A transaction structure that consititued a one-step true sale, therefore, could 
provide greater certainty to investors (and result in a savings to the selling bank) by reducing 
the likelihood of prepayment upon an insolvency of the seller. 
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on par with A's interest, but will not be entitled to bad debt protection 
from the B or C interests. Because of the reinvestment of collections, the 
seller will retain all collections on account of principal during the revolving 
period. Mter the revolving period ends, the seller and other investors in 
the trust will receive ratable portions of principal collections based on their 
then respective individual interests in the trust. Liquidation of the portfolio 
normally takes about ten months. 
To protect against bad debts, holders of the C interests will make the A 
and B interests whole to the extent of the C interests, and the B interests 
will make the A interests whole to the extent of the B interests. Bad debts 
will first, however, be covered by "excess spread." 
Excess spread will be obtained from interest collections on transferred 
receivables. The receivables will bear interest at a rate specified in the 
charge account agreements, the rate of which will have a floor of not less 
than 6% per annum. The actual return on the receivables pool will flutuate 
based upon a variety of factors (such as the rate of charge-offs, deliquencies, 
and payment rate). For purposes of this example, the return will be as-
sumed to be 20% per annum. Yield will be distributed between holders of 
A, B, and C interests based on the outstanding principal amount of their 
respective investments and will only be paid to the extent interest collections are 
actually received. The A interests will earn 5% per annum, the B interests 5.5% 
per annum and the C in terests 6 % per annum. The bank, as servicer, will earn 
2% per annum, and other fees and expenses will be about 1 % per annum. 
Bad debts have been running at 4% per annum. 
Excess spread constitutes interest collections not otherwise allocated to 
the A, B, and C interests or servicing fees or other expenses. The bank, as 
seller, will be entitled to retain all interest collections not allocated to the 
contracted-for return on the A, B, or C interests, servicing and other 
fees, or to cover bad debts. 
Finally it is assumed that $100,000 of principal collections will be ob-
tained each month (and, by definition, $16,666.66 of interest collections 
(1/12 of$200,000) (20% of$l ,000,000 = $200,000)). For simplicity's sake, 
these calculations ignore the effects of compounding interest periods. 
A monthly settlement prior to liquidation might look like this: 
Total Cash flow: $116,666.66 
Total Principal cash flow: lOO,OOO.OO 
Total Interest cash flow: 16,666.66 
Total Defaulted Receivables l30 3,333.33 
A's share of interest (85 %) 
A's share of defaults 
A's net share of interest 
A's share of servicing and other fees 
A's accrued interest 
A's excess interest 
130. 4% x $1,000,000 x 1/12 = $3,333.33 
$ 14,166.66 
2,833.33 
11,333.33 
2,124.92 
3,54l.66 
5,666.75 
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B's share of interest (5 %) 
B's share of defaults 
B's net share of interest 
B's share of servicing and other fees 
B's accrued interest 
B's excess interest 
Cs share of interest (10%) 
Cs share of defaults 
Cs net share of interest 
Cs share of servicing and other fees 
Cs accrued interest 
Cs excess interest 
Total Defaults 
Total Servicing and Other Fees 
Total Accrued Interest 
Total Excess Spread 
Seller's share of Cash Flow 
(other than on account of A's interest) 
Principal 
Excess Spread 
Total 
$ 833.33 
166.66 
666.67 
125.00 
229.16 
312.51 
$ 1,666.66 
333.33 
1,333.33 
250.00 
500.00 
583.33 
$ 3,333.33 
2,499.92 
4,270.82 
6,562.59 
$100,000.00 
6,562.59 
$106,562.59 
In this example, even though the protection for bad debts given to the 
investors in the most senior interests equals a multiple of seven times his-
torical experience and, to the most junior interests, three times historical 
experience, I3l the transfer should constitute a true sale. Bad debt protec-
tion constitutes only credit recourse, and the investors depend for their 
return entirely on yield accruing on the transferred assets, which yield is 
based upon an interest rate which must, under the terms of the charge 
account agreements, equal or exceed the return promised to investors. 132 
Retail Automobile Receivables; One-tier Structure 
In this example, a captive finance subsidiary of an automobile manu-
facturer wishes, for balance sheet purposes, to securitize $1,000,000 of auto 
131. In this example, available spread after deducting accrued interest and other expenses 
equals $9,520.84, or about three times loss experience (per month of $3,333.33), and the B 
and C interests of $150,000 equal about four times loss experience (annualized of $40,000). 
132. An interesting question would arise if the investors received a floating interest rate 
not tied to the rate earned by the receivables, but payable solely from a cash flow generated 
by the receivables (and thus, by definition, subject to a cap). As the return to the buyers 
derive from the cash flow generated by the receivables, the floating rate return, one might 
argue, should not constitute an impermissible amount of economic recourse and the transfer 
should be a true sale. See supra notes 45, 47. 
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retail installment contracts that bear a fixed rate of return equal to 9% per 
annum. The investors, however, in the trust that is to purchase the receiv-
ables, wish to obtain a floating rate of return equal to the London Inter-
bank offered rate or "Libor" plus 0.50% per annum on the notes to be 
issued by the trust and Libor plus 0.75 % per annum on the certificates to 
be issued by the trust (which on the proposed date of closing, equals 5.5% 
and 5.75% per annum, respectively). Historical loss experience equals 1 % 
per annum of total collections and the pool has an expected weighted average 
maturity of one and a half years. 
The finance company seller wishes to sell the receivables to an owner 
trust which will issue a senior class of notes with a principal amount equal 
to 97 % of the face amount of the pool and a subordinated class of certif-
icates with a principal amount equal to the remaining 3% of the face 
amount of the pool. The finance company will also enhance the certificates 
and the notes by pledging a cash collateral account equal to 5% of the 
face amount of the pool. The interest collections on the receivables will, 
as in the credit card example, be applied to pay the rate of return on the 
trust notes and certificates, the servicing fee, and to cover bad debts; the 
excess spread, if any remains, will be returned to the finance company. 
The amount of bad debt protection, as discussed above, should not dis-
qualifY the transfer from being a true sale. But what of the floating interest 
rate, which does not match the yield on the underlying receivables, and, 
if rates rise, may need to be paid out of the cash collateral account? Al-
though this appears to be economic recourse, it would seem that so long 
as the economics of the transaction are in substance the same as sale of a 
fixed rate investment together with a separate, arm's-length sale of a swap, 
the transaction should not be disqualified as a true sale. 
Retail Automobile Receivables; Two-Tier Structure 
Assume that the parties to the above transaction wished to structure the 
transaction using a two-tier structure. The seller would transfer the re-
ceivables from itself to a wholly owned SPY and the SPY would transfer 
them to an owner trust. The transfer to the SPY, which would constitute 
a true sale, would be extremely simple: 
Outstanding auto receivables 
Contribution of receivables to Spy 
Sale of receivables to Spy for purchase price equal to 
face amount of receivables 
$1,000,000 
70,000 
930,000 
The SPY would earn whatever return the receivables themselves earned 
and the transfer would therefore clearly be a true sale (even if the receiv-
ables were to earn a floating rate of interest). The Spy could then sell the 
receivables to the owner trust for $1,000,000 and pledge a portion of the 
$70,000 obtained from the trust (which it will not need to pay the finance 
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company seller as purchase price) in the cash collateral account to cover 
bad debt and interest rate risk. 
According to this Article, this transaction could be enhanced with one 
additional feature: full collectibility recourse against the seller for all de-
faulted receivables. This right of recourse would be assigned by the SPY 
to the owner trust as additional credit support for the sold receivables. 
Under the theory of this Article, full collectibility recourse would be com-
pletely consistent with the concept of true sale. 
CONCLUSION 
To analyze whether the recourse that a seller of financial assets gives to 
a buyer converts a sale into a loan, one must distinguish between collec-
tibility recourse and economic recourse. This Article shows that the ques-
tion of sale versus loan is one of state law, even in bankruptcy, and so long 
as recourse is limited to collectibility, there should be no legal reason why 
the recourse should convert the sale into a loan. 
